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ABSTRACT:
Plaintiffs who are harassed or otherwise discriminated against in retail stores on
the basis of their race or national origin have few options for legal redress. The major
federal public accommodations statute, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, does not
cover retail stores. In addition, while some state public accommodations statutes
explicitly ban discrimination in retail stores, many others do not. As a result, plaintiffs
who have been discriminated against in retail stores have turned to the contracts clause of
42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Section 1981, a Reconstruction-era civil rights statute, guarantees to all people
within the United States the same right “as is enjoyed by white citizens” to “make and
enforce contracts.” Over time, courts have changed the scope of § 1981, variously
expanding and restricting the statute’s coverage. In 1991, Congress amended the statute
to extend its requirement of equality beyond the “making” and “enforcement” of
contracts to include the “performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship.” However, many courts have continued to apply the statute narrowly,
despite the 1991 amendments that broadened its scope.
This narrowing of the statute places many clear cases of discrimination by
retailers outside § 1981’s coverage. It is wrong as a matter of statutory interpretation and
contract law. It is also wrong as a matter of history, at odds with the development of
property and contract law over time.
This paper examines and critiques courts’ narrow § 1981 jurisprudence, and offers
a model for improved § 1981 decision-making. It argues that the “right to contract”
protected by § 1981 is a process rather than a moment. The statute protects the entire
contractual relationship between customer and store: entering, browsing or sampling the
goods available, interacting with store personnel, completing a purchase, and finally
exiting the store. It also asserts that stores provide services as well as goods, and § 1981
demands that those services be provided equally to all customers, regardless of their race
or national origin. Finally, it argues that § 1981 cannot be interpreted as mandating equal
access, but then permitting unequal treatment at all points except the checkout counter.
Congress attempted to broaden § 1981 in 1991 to correct this very mistake in logic;
today’s courts have continued to interpret the statute, and the retail contracts on which the
statute pivots, narrowly and improperly.
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42 U.S.C. § 1981
Equal rights under the law
(a) Statement of equal rights. All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to
like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
(b) “Make and enforce contracts” defined. For purposes of this section, the term "make
and enforce contracts" includes the making, performance, modification, and termination
of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the
contractual relationship.
(c) Protection against impairment. The rights protected by this section are protected
against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of
State law.
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Part I: Introduction
On a July Saturday in 2003, Samaad Bishop, an African American, bought a doll
set for his daughter at a Toys‘R’ Us store in the Bronx, New York. As he was leaving
the store, a security guard approached and asked to see his receipt. Mr. Bishop initially
refused, asking why he had to show the receipt. The guard told him, “store policy,” and
allegedly went on, “This is the Bronx, not the suburbs and black people steal more than
whites.” Mr. Bishop and the guard began to argue, and the guard pushed him back into
the store. During the argument, two white women exited the store carrying Toys‘R’ Us
bags without being asked to present receipts. Mr. Bishop ultimately called the police
and, when they arrived at the store, showed them his receipt. He was then allowed to
leave.
Mr. Bishop later sued Toys ‘R’ Us under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race and national origin in contractual relationships. He
lost. The court found that because Mr. Bishop had already made his purchase, his
contract with the store was complete, and he had no rights under the statute. Though Mr.
Bishop made an adequate showing that the security guard had discriminated against him
on the basis of his race, whatever harm he suffered fell outside the coverage of § 1981. 1
Theresa McCrea’s § 1981 race discrimination claims against Saks, Inc. met with a
similar fate. On Saturday, April 18, 1998, Ms. McCrea, an African American, was

1

Bishop v. Toys ‘R’ Us-NY, LLC, No. 04-9403, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5009 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 8, 2006). Mr. Bishop also brought claims under state tort law, as well as under
another portion of § 1981, the full and equal benefits clause. In addition, he asserted
claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § § 1982 and 1983. Though the court dismissed his §
1981 contract discrimination claim, Mr. Bishop’s § 1981 full and equal benefits, § 1983,
and state law claims survived. The full and equal benefits clause of § 1981 is discussed
further in Part VII.B.1, infra.
6

shopping with her aunt and young daughter at a Saks clothing store in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. A salesman approached her about her young daughter’s behavior, and he
and Ms. McCrea began to argue. The salesman then called security, telling them to “Get
this nigger out.” Ms. McCrea, her daughter, and her aunt left the store without
purchasing the shirt they had planned to buy.
Ms. McCrea sued Saks, Inc. under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Like Mr. Bishop, she lost.
The court, in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss, reasoned that, because the store
did not outright refuse to sell the shirt to Ms. McCrea, it did not infringe on any right
protected by § 1981. Though Ms. McCrea made allegations that the salesman had
discriminated against her and her family on the basis of their race, because they were
merely “harassed and discouraged,” they could not claim the statute’s protection.2
In Bishop and McCrea, the plaintiffs were accused and harassed because they are
African American. They were treated differently from the white customers around them,
who were able to exit Toys ‘R’ Us without having to call the police and shop at Saks
without being assailed with racial epithets. However, customers like Mr. Bishop and the
McCrea family who have experienced discrimination because of their race or national
origin in retail stores have few options for legal redress. 3 The major federal public
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McCrea v. Saks, Inc., No. 00-1936, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18990 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2,
2000). Ms. McCrea also sued Saks under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
state tort law. Like her § 1981 claims, the court dismissed both her Title II and state law
claims.
3
Professor Anne-Marie G. Harris describes these claims by shoppers as “Consumer
Racial Profiling,” defined as “any type of differential treatment of consumers in the
marketplace based on race or ethnicity that constitutes a denial or degradation in the
product or service offered to the consumer.” She notes that “CRP can take many forms,
ranging from overt or outright confrontation to very subtle differences in treatment, often
manifested in forms of harassment. Outright confrontation includes verbal attacks, such
as shouting racial epithets, and physical attacks, such as removing customers from the
7

accommodations statute, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, does not cover retail
stores.4 In addition, while some state public accommodations statutes explicitly ban
discrimination in retail stores,5 no such statute exists in Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas.6 Mississippi and South
Carolina’s laws in fact empower retailers to discriminate among their customers on any
basis.7 As a result, many plaintiffs who have been discriminated against in retail stores
have turned to the contracts clause of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

store. Customer harassment includes slow or rude service, required pre-payment,
surveillance, searches of belongings, and neglect, such as refusing to serve AfricanAmerican customers.” Anne-Marie G. Harris, Shopping While Black: Applying 42
U.S.C. § 1981 to Cases of Consumer Racial Profiling, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 4
(2003).
4
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2005).
5
See, e.g., Pennsylvania: 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 954(l) (2005) (“The term ‘public
accommodation, resort or amusement’ means any accommodation, resort or amusement
which is open to, accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public, including but not
limited to . . . retail stores and establishments . . . .”); Ohio: ORC. ANN. 4112.01(9) (2005)
(“‘Place of public accommodation’ means any inn, restaurant, eating house, barbershop,
public conveyance by air, land, or water, theater, store, other place for the sale of
merchandise, or any other place of public accommodation or amusement of which the
accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges are available to the public.”).
6
Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 1283, 1437 (1996). However, Texas has passed a law
allowing revocation of a liquor license from a retailer convicted of violating “an
individual’s civil rights or the discrimination against an individual on the basis of the
individual's race, color, creed, or national origin.” TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE § 11.611
(2005).
7
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-620 (2005); (“Any person who, without legal cause or good
excuse, enters into the dwelling house, place of business, or on the premises of another
person after having been warned not to do so or any person who, having entered into the
dwelling house, place of business, or on the premises of another person without having
been warned fails and refuses, without good cause or good excuse, to leave immediately
upon being ordered or requested to do so by the person in possession or his agent or
representative shall, on conviction, be fined not more than two hundred dollars or be
imprisoned for not more than thirty days.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-23-17 (2005) (“[A
retailer] is hereby authorized and empowered to choose or select the person or persons he
or it desires to do business with, and is further authorized and empowered to refuse to sell
8

Section 1981, a Reconstruction-era civil rights statute, guarantees to all people
within the United States the same right “as is enjoyed by white citizens” to “make and
enforce contracts.” Over time, courts have changed the scope of § 1981, variously
expanding and restricting the statute’s coverage. In 1991, Congress amended the statute
to extend its requirement of equality beyond the “making” and “enforcement” of
contracts to include the “performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship.” However, many courts have continued to apply the statute narrowly,
despite the 1991 amendments that broadened its scope.
This narrowing has occurred in two ways. First, some courts have seemed simply
to ignore the 1991 amendments, continuing to focus solely on § 1981’s “make and
enforce” clause. In this view, a shopper can state a claim under § 1981 only if he or she
is clearly blocked from “making” a contract. Shoppers who successfully contract with
retail stores, but on discriminatory terms and conditions, as well as those who are
deterred, but not completely blocked from purchasing, can claim no § 1981 protection.
Other courts have made use of § 1981’s clause that prohibits discrimination in a
contract’s privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions. However, these courts have
narrowed the statute in a second way, by accepting as actionable only those privileges,
benefits, terms, and conditions that have a direct impact on the moment of purchase.
Retailers’ discriminatory acts against shoppers before or after the exchange of money for
goods fall outside the statute, and those shoppers are left with no remedy.

to, wait upon or serve any person that the owner, manager or employee of such public
place of business does not desire to sell to, wait upon or serve.”).
9

This double-narrowing of the statute— some courts’ confining its coverage to the
“make and enforce” clause and others’ recognizing only few actionable privileges,
benefits, terms, and conditions— places many clear cases of discrimination by retailers
outside § 1981’s coverage. Among those excluded are cases in which retailers deter
browsers or potential buyers from purchasing, but do not bar their entry or refuse service
outright. In addition, claims of customers who experience discrimination prior to
purchasing, but who persist and are able to transact successfully, generally cannot stand
under § 1981. Finally, cases in which a customer completes his or her transaction, but is
then discriminated against orharassed as he or she leaves the store, are left out of §
1981’s coverage.
This paper examines and critiques courts’ narrow § 1981 jurisprudence, and offers
a model for improved § 1981 decision-making.8 Part II of this paper traces the history
and amendment of § 1981. Part III surveys post-1991 §1981 retail store cases, focusing
on courts’ two ways of narrowing the statute. Part IV discusses those categories of cases
left outside § 1981’s protection. Part V attempts to explain, and then Part VI critiques,

8

Other commentators have made similar observations about courts’ application of § 1981
in retail store cases. See Abby Morrow Richardson, Applying 42 U.S.C. 1981 to Claims
of Consumer Discrimination, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 119 (2005); Amanda G. Main,
Racial Profiling in Places of Public Accommodation: Theories of Recovery and Relief, 39
BRANDEIS L.J. 289, 307 (2001) (reviewing § 1981 as one of many possible ways to
address “racial profiling” in retail stores); Deseriee A. Kennedy, Consumer
Discrimination: The Limitations of Federal Civil Rights Protection, 66 MO. L. REV. 275
(2001) (examining courts’ narrow interpretations of § 1981; focusing also on issues of
consumer credit and patterns of shopping and consumption); Harris, supra note 5
(examining § 1981 through the lens of a particular retail store discrimination case);
Singer, supra note 8 (focusing on the property law implications of § 1981 when applied
to retail stores; proposing changes to the common law to eliminate retailers’ right to
exclude).
10

judges’ § 1981 decisions. Finally, Part VII explores directions for an improved § 1981
applied to claims of race and national origin discrimination in retail stores.
Part II: The History and Amendment of § 1981
A. The Origins of § 1981
In December 1865, disturbed by reports that Southern whites were re-creating
conditions of slavery for newly freed African Americans through “pervasive and
entrenched private discrimination,”9 Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois introduced a bill
to “grant to the Freedmen basic economic rights— to make and enforce contracts, to sue
and be sued, and to purchase and lease property.”10 Congress passed the bill as the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 pursuant to its power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment’s
prohibition of slavery or involuntary servitude. The Act was radical in further extending
the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery into the realm of private economic
relationships, in compelling whites to “come down and make bargains in good faith”11
and as equals with African American Freedmen. Indeed, in the view of one member of
the Congress that passed the 1866 Act, the statute’s reach into this previously-protected
world of private contractual relations was “absolutely revolutionary.”12

9

Barry Sullivan, Reconstructing Reconstruction: Historical Reconstruction,
Reconstruction History, and the Proper Scope of Section 1981, 98 YALE L.J. 541, 552
(1989).
10
Id. at 550.
11
Id. at 555, n.96 (“The old master was not inclined to treat them differently from what
he did when they were slaves. . . . The old planters were very unwilling to come down
and make bargains in good faith.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 30, 39th Cong. 1st Sess., pt. iv,
at 116)).
12
Sullivan, supra note 11, at 547 n.38 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291
(1866) (Sen. Morrill)).
11

The language of today’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was originally part of Senator
Trumbull’s Civil Rights Act of 1866. At the time of its passage, the relevant section of
the Act read:
[C]itizens of the United States … of every race and color, without regard
to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude . . . shall
have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property,
and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . . 13

In 1870, Congress reenacted this provision of the Act pursuant to the newly-passed
Fourteenth Amendment. Congress then split the provision into two sections within the
Revised Statutes of 1874.14 The clause that became today’s § 1981 concerned the right to
contract, and read:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

The portion related to real and personal property became the current 42 U.S.C. § 1982,
and stated:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.

13
14

Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 STAT. 27 (1866) (emphasis added).
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 424 n.28 (1968).
12

Early cases applied the legislation’s bar on race-based denials of contract and
property rights to common carriers. In Coger v. North Western Union Packet Co.,15 the
Iowa Supreme Court held that the 1866 Act prohibited a steamboat from reserving a first
class table for white passengers and excluding a female schoolteacher who was one
quarter African American.16 Discussing the Act, the court commented, “The language is
comprehensive and includes the right to property and all rights growing out of contracts.
It includes within its broad terms every right arising in the affairs of life.”17
Similarly, in 1882, in Gray v. Cincinnati S. R. Co.,18 an Ohio court held the “civil
rights bill” to guarantee to an African American woman the right to a seat in the class of
train car for which she had bought a ticket. The plaintiff had purchased a first class
ticket, but was instead directed to the smoking car. The court analogized the situation to
that of a male passenger’s being denied his seat, remarking, “The gentleman's money is
just as good as the lady's, in the eye of the law, and they are bound to provide for him
such reasonable accommodations as he has paid and contracted for.”19 With regard to
the plaintiff herself, the court found that, “Whatever the social relations of life may be,
before the law we all stand upon the broad plane of equality. And this company was
bound to provide for this colored woman precisely such accommodations, in every
respect, as were provided upon their train for white women.”20

15

37 Iowa 145 (1873).
Id. at 149 (describing the plaintiff’s identity as a “quadroon” and noting that “by her
spirited resistance and her defiant words, as well as by her pertinacity in demanding the
recognition of her rights and in vindicating them, she has exhibited evidence of the
Anglo-Saxon blood that flows in her veins”).
17
Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
18
11 F. 683 (Ohio, 1882).
19
Id. at 686 (emphasis added).
20
Id.
16
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There is also evidence, however, that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was limited in
its ability to reach far into the realm of private economic choice. After the Civil Rights
Cases21 invalidated a separate federal public accommodations law in 1883, courts’
interpretations of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 became correspondingly narrow. For
example, in Bowlin v. Lyon,22 the Supreme Court of Iowa upheld the right of skating rink
owners to refuse to sell a ticket to an African American man on the basis of his race,
despite advertisements that the rink was open to the public:
The act complained of by plaintiff was the withdrawal by defendants as to
him of the offers which they had made to admit him, or to contract with
him, for admission. They had the right to do this as to him, or any other
members of the public. This right, as we have seen, is not based upon the
fact that he belongs to a particular race, but arises from the consideration
that neither he, nor any other person, could demand, as a right under the
law, that the privilege of entering the place be accorded to him.23

Though the plaintiff’s complaint focused on his right to make a contract, rather
than his right to enter the skating rink as a place of public accommodation, the
court imported the narrow reasoning of the Civil Rights Cases and dismissed the
plaintiff’s contract-based claim.
Thus, while some early courts vigorously enforced § 1981’s guarantee of
equal contract rights to African Americans, others refused to challenge the very
private acts of discrimination that had troubled Senator Trumbull. Despite cases
like Bowlin, § 1981 remained law, and continued to be a source of protection for
many African Americans who had been discriminated against by common carriers

21

109 U.S. 3 (1883).
67 Iowa 536 (1885).
23
Id. at 540 (emphasis added).
22
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and in public accommodations.24 However, the question of the statute’s
revolutionary reach into what had previously been the shielded realm of private
contractual relations has remained in dispute into modern times.
B. The Modern History of § 1981
The modern history of § 1981 can be traced to a 1968 Supreme Court decision,
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. While early cases brought pursuant to Senator Trumbull’s
civil rights act concerned race discrimination on common carriers and in places of public
accommodation, in Jones, the Court faced the question of whether § 1982, § 1981’s
companion statute, barred “purely private discrimination” in a white owner’s sale of a
home to an African American family.25 The Court examined the twin histories of § 1981
and § 1982, noting Congress’ fear in 1866 that private “custom or prejudice” might
infringe on African Americans’ property rights.26 The Court determined that § 1982’s
prohibition of race discrimination in the purchase and sale of real and personal property
extended to private discriminatory acts. “We hold that § 1982 bars allracial
discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale of rental of property, and that the
statute, thus construed, is a valid exercise of the power of Congress . . . .”27
In 1974, the Court turned from § 1982 to the question of § 1981’s application to
private acts of discrimination. In Runyon v. McCrary, African American families sued

24

See generally Singer, supra note 8, at 1378-82.
Jones, 392 U.S. at 419.
26
Id. at 423.
27
Id. at 413. Note that in Jones, the Court drew authority for its decision from the
Thirteenth, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. “Because we have concluded that the
discrimination alleged in the petitioners' complaint violated a federal statute that
Congress had the power to enact under the Thirteenth Amendment, we find it
unnecessary to decide whether that discrimination also violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 413 n.5.
25
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whites-only private schools under § 1981, and the schools argued that the statute did not
apply to private actors. The Court observed that the schools had advertised and offered
their services to members of the general public, but then refused to serve white and
nonwhite students equally.28 Citing Jones, the Runyon Court applied § 1981’s contracts
clause to the schools’ discriminatory refusal to deal, stating:
The petitioning schools and school association argue principally that §
1981 does not reach private acts of racial discrimination. That view is
wholly inconsistent with Jones’ interpretation of the legislative history of
§ 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, an interpretation that was
reaffirmed in [later Supreme Court cases] . . . And this consistent
interpretation of the law necessarily requires the conclusion that § 1981,
like § 1982, reaches private conduct.29

By 1974, therefore, the Supreme Court had interpreted both § 1982 and the
contracts clause of § 1981 broadly, allowing the statute’s protection to reach the
“pervasive and entrenched private discrimination” that the 1866 Act was written
to combat.30
C. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union
In 1989, this trend of liberal interpretation of § 1981 and § 1982 came to a halt.
The Supreme Court decided Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, in which an African
American employee brought suit under § 1981, claiming that her employer had harassed
her-- including commenting that “blacks are known to work slower than whites”-- failed
to promote her, and then terminated her. 31 Though the Court upheld Runyon’s broad
application of § 1981 to private discriminatory acts, the Court also adopted an extremely

28

Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 164-65 (1976).
Id. at 173.
30
Sullivan, supra note 11, at 552.
31
491 U.S. 164, 178 (1989).
29
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narrow view of the phases of the employment relationship covered by the statute. The
Court stated:
The most obvious feature of [§ 1981] is the restriction of its scope to
forbidding discrimination in the “mak[ing] and enforce[ment]” of
contracts alone. Where an alleged act of discrimination does not involve
the impairment of one of these specific rights, § 1981 provides no relief.
Section 1981 cannot be construed as a general proscription of racial
discrimination in all aspects of contract relations, for it expressly
prohibits discrimination only in the making and enforcement of
contracts.32

According to the Court, the harassment and discrimination that the plaintiff suffered fell
outside § 1981’s coverage because it took place after the initial formation of the
employment contract. In reaching this conclusion, the Court first located a time period in
which it determined “contract formation” to have occurred, and then drew a bright line
between the “formation” and “postformation” phases of the employment relationship.
Relying on this distinction, the Court held:
[T]he right to make contracts does not extend, as a matter of either logic or
semantics, to conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been
established, including breach of the terms of the contract or imposition of
discriminatory working conditions. Such postformation conduct does not
involve the right to make a contract, but rather implicates the performance
of established contract obligations and the conditions of continuing
employment . . . .33

Though he concurred with the majority’s upholding of Runyon, Justice Brennan
dissented vigorously from the majority’s narrow reading of the statute’s coverage. Joined
by Justices Marshall and Blackmun and in part by Justice Stevens, Justice Brennan
attacked the Court’s formalism, accusing the majority of applying the statute in a manner

32
33

Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
Id. at 177.
17

“antithetical to Congress’ vision of a society in which contractual opportunities are
equal.”34 Rather than ending the § 1981 inquiry at the bright line marking the edge of
“contract formation,” Justice Brennan viewed discriminatory postformation conduct as
evidence that the initial contract had been made on unequal terms.35 As an example, he
offered the scenario of an employer’s extending the same employment contract to African
American and white applicants, but telling the African American applicant, “there’s a lot
of harassment going on in this workplace and you have to agree to that.”36 The Patterson
plaintiff, he maintained, suffered the same harm as the fictional African American
applicant, and “in neither case can it be said that whites and blacks have had the same
right to make an employment contract.”37
In a footnote, Justice Brennan offered a second way in which postformation
discriminatory conduct would fall within § 1981’s coverage. He recognized that
postformation race discrimination against a contracting party might deter other members
of that party’s race from even beginning negotiations in the first place. He stated,
“[W]hen a person is deterred, because of his race, from even entering negotiations, his
equal opportunity to contract is denied as effectively as if he were discouraged by an
offer of less favorable terms.”38
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent in which he challenged the notion that an
employment contract exists only at a single moment and is susceptible to clear

34

Id. at 189.
Id. at 207-08 (“[T]he language of § 1981 is quite naturally read as extending to cover
postformation conduct that demonstrates that the contract was not really made on equal
terms at all.”).
36
Id. at 208.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 209.
35
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demarcation at its borders. Noting that an at-will employee is “constantly remaking [his
or her] contract,” he argued that, “if, after the employment relationship is formed, the
employer deliberately implements a policy of harassment of black employees, it has
imposed a contractual term on them that is not the ‘same’ as the contractual provisions
that ‘are enjoyed by white citizens.’”39 To Stevens, the majority’s view of “contract” as a
discrete event capable of being pinpointed at one moment in time ignored contracts’ true
identity as “evidence of a vital, ongoing relationship between human beings.”40 Despite
the Brennan and Stevens dissents, however, the Patterson majority’s narrow
interpretation of the statute was binding, and § 1981 could be applied only to
discrimination that took place at the moment of contract formation.
D. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
Three years later, with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress overruled
Patterson, along with multiple other Supreme Court decisions that had interpreted civil
rights laws narrowly.41 The Act amended § 1981 to broaden its coverage beyond the
making and enforcement of contracts, specifically repudiating the Patterson majority’s
cramped reading of the statute. Comments from the legislative history of the 1991 Act
reveal the sentiment that “[t]he Patterson decision [had] sharply cut back on the scope
and effectiveness of section 1981 … [with] profoundly negative consequences both in the

39

Id. at 221.
Id.
41
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturned six Supreme Court opinions in addition to
Patterson. Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U.L. REV. 1, 99 n.96 (1992)
(listing the cases as Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), Lorance v.
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employment context and elsewhere.”42 The report of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources identified “a compelling need for legislation to overrule the
Patterson decision and ensure that federal law prohibits all race discrimination in
contracts.”43 Congress therefore added subsection (b) to the statute, defining “make and
enforce contracts” to include “the making, performance, modification, and termination of
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the
contractual relationship.” Congress also added subsection (c), which states, “The rights
protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental
discrimination and impairment under color of State law.” This section codified the
Runyon holding applying § 1981 to acts of private discrimination. Finally, though not
explicitly mentioned in the amended statute, Congress approved of a Supreme Court
decision, St. Francis College v. AlKhazraji,44 which had applied § 1981 not only to race
discrimination, but to discrimination on the basis of national origin as well.45
Thus, today’s § 1981 is the most recent version of a statute whose interpretation,
reach, and coverage have changed over time. Since 1991, the statute as written would
seem to provide far-reaching protections against private acts of race and national origin
discrimination in contractual relationships. Indeed, in a 1994 § 1981 employment case,
the Supreme Court described the post-1991 amended statute as applying to “all phases
42
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and incidents of the contractual relationship . . . .”46 Yet despite Congress’ broadening of
the statute, many courts continue to apply it narrowly in cases of discrimination in retail
stores, focusing only on the “make and enforce” clause or limiting the actionable
privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions to those that have a direct impact on the
moment of purchase.47
Part III: Courts’ Double-Narrowing of § 1981
A. The Conception of Contract in Post-1991 § 1981 Retail Store Cases
Before examining the post-1991 cases in which courts have narrowed § 1981, it is
important to note the conception of contract that lies beneath those courts’ restricted
readings of the statute. The right to equal treatment that § 1981 confers is not freestanding, but rather tied to an underlying contractual relationship. Courts’ view of that
underlying contract therefore influences their § 1981 jurisprudence. Though very few
courts actually engage with contract law in their § 1981 retail store decisions, one can
imagine courts’ asking two preliminary questions at the outset of their § 1981 analyses:
When is a retail contract made, and what is a retail contract for?
In response to the first question, a court could mark the beginning of the retail
contractual relationship at multiple points. The relationship might be created by a
shopper’s entry into a retail store, signifying his or her “acceptance” of the store’s “offer”
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of goods. Alternatively, the contractual relationship might begin when a customer locates
the item for which he or she was looking, and end when he or she purchases those goods.
In § 1981 retail cases, however, courts have almost universally defined the
contractual relationship between customer and retailer as both beginning and ending with
the exchange of money for goods. Retail contracts come to resemble the Patterson
majority’s discrete, cabined employment contract, rather than Justice Stevens’ “vital,
ongoing relationship between human beings.”48 As the Fifth Circuit has stated, “A
contract for employment involves a continuing contractual relationship that lasts for the
duration of the agreement . . . In the retail context, by contrast, there is no continuing
contractual relationship. Instead, the relationship is based on a single discrete
transaction--the purchase of goods.”49 The contract is a moment, rather than a process,
and a contract’s “making” and “enforcement” happen simultaneously at the point of
purchase. As a result, when post-1991 courts limit § 1981’s coverage to contracts’
“making” and “enforcement,” they also confine its protections to the point of purchase,
the moment when a customer exchanges money for goods and the contract is both made
and enforced.
Courts have answered the second question— a retail contract’s content— by
refusing to view the contract as a bargain for much more than the goods sold. In other
types of § 1981 case, such as claims brought against restaurants, courts have read the
contract as encompassing service as well as goods. In the retail store context, though
some courts have recognized that § 1981’s subsection (b) requires equality in a retail
48
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contract’s privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions, this recognition has not translated
into a consideration of many terms and conditions— quality of customer service provided
to African American versus white customers, for example— beyond the goods
purchased. Instead, courts have generally accepted only those privileges, benefits, terms,
and conditions that are tightly linked to the point of purchase, and have refused to
examine service provided before or after that moment. Given the option to view service
as well as goods as part of a retail contract, courts have adopted a limited view of the
contracts’ content, confining the bargain to the goods exchanged for money.
The two ways in which courts have narrowed § 1981— focusing exclusively on
the “make and enforce” clause and acknowledging only a few actionable privileges,
benefits, terms, and conditions— are thus based on a correspondingly limited view of the
duration and content of the contract between customer and retailer. An examination of
courts’ post-1991 § 1981 jurisprudence reveals both courts’ double-narrowing of the
statute and the restricted view of retail contracts on which it is based.
B. The “Make and Enforce” Clause
Post-1991 courts’ first method of narrowing § 1981 has been to limit its coverage
to only the “making” and “enforcement” of contracts. For these courts, a successful
§ 1981 claim must involve the complete denial of a shopper’s right to “make” a contract
in the form of a retailer’s outright refusal to deal. In retail settings, an outright refusal
comes in several forms: a store’s barring a customer’s entry, asking a customer to leave,
or refusing to complete a customer’s transaction at or near the checkout counter. In the
pre-1991 Patterson-era, this type of claim represented the archetypal § 1981 retail store
case, and courts easily identified violations of those customers’ rights to “make and
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enforce” retail contracts.50 Because the pre-1991 statute contained no “privileges,
benefit, terms, and conditions” language, the statute’s protection was also limited to those
core cases. In 1991, Congress broadened the statute by prohibiting discrimination in
contracts’ privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions. Yet despite the 1991 amendments,
some courts have continued to limit the statute’s coverage to cases involving outright
refusals to deal. This narrowing of the statute is evident in courts’ reasons for dismissing
some § 1981 cases and for letting others stand, policing the boundaries of this “core”
category of cases.
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits, for example, have dismissed § 1981 retail store
cases on the ground that the plaintiffs, though clearly discriminated against on the basis
of their race or national origin, failed to show that retailers had blocked them from
“making” or “enforcing” their contracts. In Arguello v. Conoco,51 the Fifth Circuit
required Latino plaintiffs who had successfully purchased gas, but then abandoned an
attempt to purchase beer when a clerk addressed them with racial epithets, to show that
they were actually “thwarted” from contracting, rather than merely deterred. The court
identified a “rule” in the Fifth Circuit that, “where a customer has engaged in an actual
attempt to contract that was thwarted by the merchant, courts have been willing to
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An example of a pre-1991 core § 1981 case is Watson v. Fraternal Order of Eagles,
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recognize a § 1981 claim.”52 Because the court found that the Arguello plaintiffs bought
gas and then “voluntarily” abandoned the beer purchase, they could not make the core
showing of an outright refusal to contract.
The Seventh Circuit dismissed a similar § 1981 retail store case in Morris v.
Office Max, Inc.53 The court’s reasoning shows that it shared the Fifth Circuit’s view of
the core and limits of the statute’s coverage. In Office Max, police officers questioned
African American customers regarding stolen items, remarking that the plaintiffs were
“guilty by association,” allegedly referring to their race. The court rejected the plaintiffs’
claims, explaining that the plaintiffs “were neither denied admittance nor service, nor
were they asked to leave the store.”54 As illustrated by Arguelloand Office Max, even
after 1991, courts have continued to define as the extent of § 1981’s protections its “make
and enforce” clause, violated only by a retailer’s outright refusal to deal.
Courts’ narrowing of the statute is evident not only in the cases of plaintiffs who
lose, but also in courts’ reasons for allowing other claims to stand. Though these
plaintiffs’ § 1981 claims are successful, the courts deciding their cases have employed a
narrow § 1981 analysis quite similar to that in Arguello and Office Max. The plaintiffs
may win, but only because they are able to state a claim that falls within the courts’
limited view of the statute. Though not a retail store case, an example is Causey v. Sewell
Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc.,55 in which an African American was refused service on his car
and told, “Niggers always want something for nothing.” Relying on the Arguello court’s
interpretation of the limits of § 1981, the Fifth Circuit characterized the plaintiff’s claim
52
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as a classic § 1981 violation, a situation in which “a merchant denies service or outright
refuses to engage in business with a consumer attempting to contract with the
merchant.”56 Similarly, in Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,57 the plaintiff, an African
American, was accused of shoplifting and asked to leave a store by police, requiring her
to abandon a shopping cart full of merchandise. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the
plaintiff “had selected merchandise to purchase, had the means to complete the
transaction, and would, in fact, have completed her purchase had she not been asked to
leave the store.”58 On this ground, the court allowed her § 1981 claim to stand,
remarking that the case “involve[d] none of the difficulties that other courts have
encountered in determining whether there was a valid contract interest at stake.”59
This narrowed application of § 1981 is evident in two final district court cases in
which the plaintiffs succeeded in making out core § 1981 claims. In Burgin v. Toys-RUs,60 the plaintiffs alleged that a store clerk verbally harassed them at the check-out
counter and returned the money they had already tendered. A security guard then
removed them from the store and remarked, “See, that's why I don't like those niggers.”61
In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court stated, “[T]he instant plaintiffs
have alleged that they were denied the right to purchase goods— i.e., to make a
contract— because they are black; moreover, they allege that [the guard] referred to them
as ‘niggers.’ It is difficult— and unnecessary— to imagine more specific allegations
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under the circumstances.”62 The court viewed Burgin as presenting a classic case of a §
1981 violation: an outright refusal to deal on a race-discriminatory basis. Likewise, in
Shen v. A&P Food Stores,63 the plaintiffs alleged that a retailer refused to sell them
groceries because they were Chinese American, shouting “Go back to China.” The court
found that the plaintiffs had stated a cognizable § 1981 claim, holding that “the refusal to
sell groceries is a denial of the right to enter into a contract.”
These courts have seemed to ignore Congress’ addition of subsection (b) to the
statute. Indeed, the plaintiffs in Arguello and Office Max might have made successful
claims that their retail contracts contained inferior and unequal privileges, benefits, terms,
and conditions, in violation of subsection (b).64 However, these courts have disregarded
the statute’s expanded form, clinging to a pre-1991 view of the core and limits of the
statute’s coverage. For plaintiffs whose claims fall within that core, who have
experienced a retailer’s outright refusal to deal, courts have usually interpreted § 1981 to
provide protection, as illustrated by Causey, Christian, Burgin, and Shen. As in Arguello
and Office Max, however, for many plaintiffs who cannot show a discriminatory outright
refusal, courts’ adherence to this view of § 1981’s core and failure to engage with
subsection (b) have removed any opportunity for redress under the statute.
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C. The “Privileges, Benefits, Terms, and Conditions” Clause
Though some courts have limited § 1981’s reach to cases in which plaintiffs have
been blocked from “making” contracts, ignoring subsection (b), others have accepted as
additional § 1981 violations situations in which a contract is formed, but with unequal
privileges, benefits, terms, or conditions. Examples of cases in this category include
customers who have been required to pre-pay or pay by certain methods, addressed with
racial slurs at the point of purchase, and arrested by police during a transaction. These
customers all complete their purchases, and are therefore not blocked from “making” and
“enforcing” a retail contract. Because the contractual moment is altered on the basis of
race or national origin, however, courts have been willing to find violations of § 1981.
Though at first glance these courts seem to be widening the reach of § 1981 beyond those
cases summarized above, their analyses in fact represent a second narrowing of the
statute, for the terms, conditions, privileges, and benefits they have recognized are few,
limited only to those discriminatory acts that have a direct impact on the contractual
moment.
An example of such a case is Hill v. Shell Oil Co.,65 in which African American,
but not white, customers were required to pre-pay for gasoline. In refusing to dismiss the
plaintiffs’ case, the court explicitly rejected the defendant’s attempts to confine § 1981’s
protections to refusal-to-deal cases. Foreshadowing the Fifth Circuit’s Arguello decision,
the defendant argued that “because plaintiffs were admitted into the gas stations and
ultimately were able to purchase gas, there has been no tangible deprivation of rights
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protected by § 1981….”66 The court held to the contrary, that the discriminatory prepayment requirement “adversely affected the basic terms and conditions of [the
plaintiffs’] contract to purchase gasoline from Shell-brand stations.”67 Essential to the
court’s analysis was the timing of the discrimination “at the point of sale, directly
implicating plaintiffs' right to contract and to enjoy ‘all benefits, privileges, terms, and
conditions of the contractual relationship.’”68 The court therefore recognized a § 1981
violation in the imposition of discriminatory contractual terms and conditions. However,
the court still narrowed its analysis, tethering the terms and conditions claim to the
conception of a retail contract as existing only at a moment, “at the point of sale.”69
In Buchanan v. Consolidated Stores Corp.,70 the court accepted as actionable
similar discrimination at the point of sale. In that case, a chain of toy stores maintained a
policy of refusing African American customers’ personal checks. The court held that,
though the plaintiffs were ultimately successful in making purchases, the no-check policy
violated § 1981’s terms and conditions clause. Analogizing the case to Hill v. Shell Oil
Co., the court stated, “the defendants placed a special condition on Plaintiffs’ right to
contract . . . Further, both sets of plaintiffs alleged that the respective defendants’
discriminatory policies adversely affected the basic terms and conditions of their contract
to purchase merchandise.”71
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Though it did not involve a retail store, Hill v. Kookies, Inc.,72 represents another
privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions case. In Hill, African Americans were required
to pay a $13.00 cover price to gain entry to a bar, while white patrons were charged only
$3.00.73 Though the bulk of the opinion concerns the question of whether race
discrimination existed, the court allowed the plaintiffs’ § 1981 claim to stand, perhaps
because the discriminatory pricing scheme altered contractual moment itself, the
exchange of money for entry.
By recognizing privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions in addition to core
refusal-to-deal claims under § 1981, these courts seem to be engaging with subsection (b)
of § 1981 and reading the statute more broadly. However, it is important to recognize
that each successful § 1981 claim in this category stems from a discriminatory privilege,
benefit, term, or condition that is tightly linked to the contractual moment, the “point of
sale,” in the words of the Hill v. Shell Oil Co. court. Beneath these courts’ analyses is an
idea of contract as a discrete moment or “point” rather than Justice Stevens’ “ongoing
relationship.”74 As a result, discrimination that occurs outside the contractual moment is
left without remedy under § 1981. In effect, this narrow § 1981 creates areas of
immunity for retailers in which race and national origin discrimination is permitted and
protected.

reason for their no-check policy and that the plaintiffs had failed to show that this reason
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Part IV: Categories of Cases Excluded from § 1981’s Coverage
Courts’ double-narrowing of § 1981, either by limiting the statute’s protection to
the making and enforcement of contracts or by recognizing only privileges, benefits,
terms, and conditions that implicate the moment of contract, leaves three categories of
cases outside the statute’s coverage. First are those in which browsers are discriminated
against or potential customers are deterred, but not entirely blocked, from purchasing.
Second are those in which customers experience discrimination or harassment by retailers
prior to transacting, but then persevere and successfully make a purchase. Third are those
in which customers purchase from a retail store, but then are discriminated against after
the purchase is complete. Even when a retailer does not contest a plaintiff’s allegations
of race discrimination, courts have adhered to their narrow construction of § 1981 in
these cases and refused to extend the statute’s protection.
A. Browsers and Potential Customers
The view of § 1981 as limited to the “make and enforce” clause— and violations
of the statute as consisting only of retailers’ outright refusals to deal— denies § 1981
relief to browsers and potential customers who are discriminated against in retail stores.
Courts have rejected these § 1981 claims in two ways. First, courts have dismissed
browsers’ claims on the ground that they cannot show an intent to purchase, and therefore
no right to “make” a contract with which a retailer has interfered. Alternatively, courts
have analyzed claims by browsers as if the plaintiffs were asserting an open-ended right
to make future contracts, and arguing that present discrimination by stores has deterred
them or others from entering into these future contracts. Though Justice Brennan

31

suggested this very reading of § 1981 in his Patterson dissent, courts have not recognized
such a right under § 1981, and have therefore dismissed browsers’ claims.75
Second, courts have rejected claims by potential customers who intend to make a
purchase and are discriminatorily deterred, but not clearly asked to leave or completely
denied service. Courts in these cases differentiate between retailers’ outright refusals to
deal and forms of deterrence that fall somewhere below that level. As in Arguello, any
hint that a customer voluntarily departed a store or abandoned his or her purchase attempt
defeats his or her § 1981 claim. Because these plaintiffs cannot show an intent to
purchase, or because they can show only a retailer’s deterrence, but not denial, courts
have dismissed their § 1981 claims.
Courts’ treatment of browsers’ § 1981 claims is illustrated in Turner v. Fashion
Bug,76 in which the Sixth Circuit denied the claim of an African American man who was
browsing for Mother’s Day gift ideas for his wife. A store clerk accused the plaintiff of
shoplifting and carrying a gun and called the police, who ultimately arrested the plaintiff
for disorderly conduct.77 The Sixth Circuit dismissed the plaintiff’s case, reasoning:
[The plaintiff] had nothing in hand that he intended to purchase, and had
nothing in particular in mind that he intended to buy. The fact that Turner
may have made a purchase if he had found something he wanted to buy
does not amount to a present intent to enter into a contract.78

The absence of an intent to purchase doomed the plaintiff’s § 1981 case, converting it, in
the court’s eyes, to a non-actionable claim for a future contract. In addition, though the
75
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court might have viewed the retailer’s accusations of shoplifting and calling the police as
a refusal to deal, regardless of the plaintiff’s intent to purchase, it did not do so, and
upheld dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim.
Claims under § 1981 by browsers have met with a similar fate in the Fifth Circuit.
In Morris v. Dillard’s Dept. Stores, Inc.,79 a case that would seem to fall squarely within
§ 1981’s “make and enforce” clause, a retail store accused a customer of shoplifting, had
her arrested, and then banned her from returning. Though by banning the customer, the
store in effect refused service to her on all future occasions, the court denied her § 1981
claim. The court required the plaintiff to show “evidence of some tangible attempt to
contract with Dillard’s during the course of the ban, which could give rise to a contractual
duty between her and the merchant, and which was in some way thwarted.”80 The court
thus viewed the plaintiff during the ban as a mere browser, not blocked from entering the
store in violation of § 1981 but rather only able to assert a non-actionableclaim to future
contracts.
Courts’ rejection of § 1981 claims by potential customers who intend to purchase
specific items, but are deterred from doing so, has been similar, and is evident in two
district court opinions. In Sterling v. Kazmierczak, 81 the plaintiff, an African American,
entered a Sportmart store with his father, looking for air rifle cartridges. Before he
located the cartridges, a security guard accused him of stealing the Nike Jordan sneakers
he was wearing. The guard ignored Mr. Sterling’s explanation that he had bought the
shoes four days earlier at a different store, and that he had the receipt. Instead, the guard
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took the shoes from Mr. Sterling’s feet and called the police. Mr. Sterling was ultimately
arrested and charged with retail theft, but was found not guilty.
Mr. Sterling sued the Sportmart store under § 1981, but lost. Thecourt dismissed
his claim, finding that because Mr. Sterling had not located the air rifle cartridges, he had
not shown that he was actually going to contract with the store. Though Mr. Sterling
made an adequate showing that the security guard had discriminated against him on the
basis of his race,82 whatever harm he suffered fell outside the coverage of § 1981.83
Likewise, in Evans v. Harry’s Hardware,84 a retailer won on summary judgment,
defeating the plaintiff’s argument that she was prevented from purchasing goods on the
basis of her race. Characterizing her claim as one of a right to a future contract, the court
dismissed the plaintiff’s claim, stating that “bare allegations of a ‘deterrence’ from
purchasing goods, ‘constructive refusal’ of service, or interference with a prospective
contractual relation (without the allegation of an actual loss of a contractual interest) are
speculative and insufficient to state a claim under § 1981.”85
A review of § 1981 claims by browsers and potential customers reveals only one
in which the plaintiff was successful. In Ackerman v. Food-4-Less,86 the court refused to
dismiss the § 1981 claim of an African American plaintiff who was accused of
shoplifting in a grocery store, detained for over two hours by store security guards, and
addressed with racial slurs. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff
had not stated an actionable § 1981 claim because she had demonstrated no intent to
82
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purchase groceries, specifically a packet of spice powder she had picked from a shelf.
The court stated:
The purpose of going to a grocery store is to buy groceries. The purpose of
picking an item off the shelf at a grocery store is so one may buy it. We feel that
it is a very reasonable inference that Plaintiff picked up the Spanish spice powder
so that she could purchase the seasoning. Therefore, Defendant's argument that
Plaintiff’s mere act of picking up the spice is not evidence enough of her intent to
form a contract fails.87

Despite this seemingly expansive reading of § 1981, however, the court then remarked
that if the plaintiff, after being released from the guard’s detention, had successfully
purchased from the store, her § 1981 claim would fail, as her contract rights would not
have been violated.88
Thus, courts almost universally refuse to recognize the § 1981 claims of
browsers— those with no intent to purchase— and potential customers— those who are
deterred, but not blocked, from purchasing. By adhering to a narrow view of § 1981 as
protecting only the “making” and “enforcement” of contracts, courts limit the statute’s
coverage, denying relief to this set of plaintiffs who have clearly experienced
discrimination at retailers’ hands.
B. Pre-purchase Discrimination
The second category of cases excluded from § 1981’s protections are those in
which customers are discriminated against prior to purchasing, but are nevertheless able
to complete their transaction. Typical cases include those in which plaintiffs are
discriminatorily followed, stopped while shopping, and questioned about their activities.
With few exceptions, courts have refused to extend § 1981’s protections to these cases,
87
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reasoning that, because the plaintiffs are ultimately able to make a purchase, their
contract rights are not impaired.
In dismissing these cases of pre-purchase discrimination, courts have effectively
picked and chosen which privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions they deem actionable
under § 1981. Indeed, one could argue that a customer’s being forced to accept the
“condition” of being trailed through a store because of his or her race before completing a
purchase appears clearly to be a violation of § 1981’s “terms and conditions” clause.
However, because these forms of discrimination do not occur at the moment of purchase,
and because the plaintiffs are able to complete their transactions, courts have dismissed
their claims. In the background of these analyses, courts seem to be adhering to a vision
of the core § 1981 case as a refusal to “make” a contract, and a narrow idea of a retail
contract’s duration and content.
In a typical pre-purchase discrimination case, Jeffery v. Home Depot,89 an African
American plaintiff was in the process of paying for a deadbolt lock when the store clerk
asked to see what was inside the plaintiff’s bag. The plaintiff refused, and, after a
discussion with the clerk’s supervisor, purchased the lock and left the store. The court
held that the plaintiff “suffered no actual loss of a contract interest. While Jeffery's
purchase of the deadbolt was delayed by the search request, no search ever took place.
Jeffery eventually purchased the deadbolt and left the store unhindered. He was not
denied service or detained.”90 The court went on to note that, though the issue of the
clerk’s racially discriminatory intent was in dispute, “even if the search request was
racially motivated, § 1981 would still not provide a statutory basis for a remedy in this
89
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case because Jeffery cannot prove interference with a contract right.”91 The court’s
reference to the fact that the plaintiff “was not denied service” points to the persistence of
the background idea that the core § 1981 case is an outright refusal to deal. Because
Jeffery did not fall into that category, and because the request to look in the plaintiff’s
bag and delay in service were not linked tightly enough to the contractual moment, the
claim failed.
Though the defendant was a bank rather than a retail store, Lewis v. Commerce
Bank & Trust,92 is similar. An African American attempting to cash his student loan
check was required to complete his transaction in the bank’s lobby rather than at the
drive-through window. After the plaintiff cashed his check, the bank circulated to other
branches a video of the plaintiff’s transaction and a memorandum describing him as a
likely bank robber. The court concluded, however, that the plaintiff failed to state a §
1981 claim, holding:
[A] delay in cashing checks and a request that plaintiff complete the
transaction in the bank lobby as opposed to the drive-through facility do
not appear to deprive a person of the benefits, privileges, terms and
conditions of a contractual relationship with the bank for the purposes of §
1981.93

Because the plaintiff was able to complete a contract with the bank, he could make no
claim under § 1981. In the eyes of the court, mere delay in his transaction, even if on the
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basis of race, did not rise to the level of a discriminatory term or condition, and did not
trigger § 1981’s protections.94
Interestingly, some courts have found that a racially-motivated delay in a
transaction does give rise to a § 1981 claim. Unlike in Jeffery and Lewis, these courts
have been willing to categorize cases of pre-purchase discrimination as actionable § 1981
claims, recognizing that delay, if made on the ground of race, might represent a term or
condition imposed on whites and non-whites unequally. In another bank case, Allen v.
U.S. Bancorp,95 an African American business account holder was required to remove his
sunglasses and wait in the line for personal, rather than business, accounts. In its opinion,
the court recognized that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 expanded the scope of § 1981, and
reasoned:
While the outright denial of services is certainly a sufficient basis for
finding a § 1981 violation, it is not a necessary condition under the
statutory scheme Congress outlined in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. A
logical extension of defendant's reasoning would allow a restaurant to
utilize segregated seating and not offend § 1981. African American
patrons could still enjoy the “fundamental characteristic of the contractual
relationship” because they would “get their meal,” albeit in a segregated
setting. Similarly, under defendant's scheme, a store patron told to wait in
a longer line reserved for people of color would have no claim because he
or she would eventually be able to purchase the item after enduring racebased delay and harassment.96

The court recognized the required removal of sunglasses as an “additional restriction” on
African American, but not white, customers. “By imposing additional restrictions in
order to receive service, defendant offered plaintiff different ‘terms and conditions of the
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contractual relationship’ because of his race.”97 The court identified his having to change
lines as another such “additional restriction.” “By requiring plaintiff to wait in a separate
line because of his race, defendant explicitly denied plaintiff the benefit of timely service
enjoyed by other customers.”98 Unlike the Jeffery and Lewis courts, the Allen court was
willing to accept the plaintiff’s § 1981 terms and conditions claims, though they went
beyond the few— differential pricing and payment schemes— recognized by other
courts.
Williams v. Cloverleaf Farms Dairy,99 provides a final example of a court’s
willingness to view pre-purchase discrimination as actionable, thereby extending §
1981’s protections to more plaintiffs who have been discriminated against in retail stores.
In Williams, the African American plaintiff attempted to make a purchase from a
convenience store cashier. That cashier made racial slurs and refused service.100 After
some delay, a second cashier completed the sale. The court held that the combination of
the delay and the racial slurs constituted an alteration in the contract’s terms and
conditions sufficient to give rise to a § 1981 claim.101
The First Circuit has summed up the confusion among courts surrounding this
issue of defining the reach of § 1981’s “privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions”
language. In dicta in Garrett v. Tandy Corp.,102 Judge Selya explained:
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Of course, section 1981, like many laws, is more easily interpreted at the
polar extremes. The statute applies, for example, if a store refuses, on
race-based grounds, to permit a customer to purchase its wares. By the
same token, it does not apply if no contractual relationship is ever
contemplated by either party (say, if a store manager makes a racially
insensitive comment to a fireman who responds to a false alarm). The
harder cases occupy the middle ground: cases in which a contract was
made and the alleged discrimination bears some relation to it…
Particularly after the passage of the 1991 amendment, such situations call
for careful line-drawing, case by case.103

In this case by case analysis, it is likely that those courts who adhere to a “contractual
moment” view of retail contracts and define § 1981 as consisting only of the “make and
enforce” clause will interpret § 1981 as in Jeffery and Lewis, while those who take a more
expansive view of the statute will come out closer to Allen and Williams.
C. Post-purchase Discrimination
The third and final category of cases excluded from § 1981’s coverage includes
claims by plaintiffs who successfully purchase from a retail store, but are then harassed
or mistreated on the basis of race or national origin after their transaction is complete.
Using largely the same reasoning as in pre-purchase discrimination cases, courts
confronted with cases in this category have nearly universally declined to extend
§ 1981’s coverage, maintaining that the customer’s rights vis-à-vis the store end with the
completion of the purchase. These cases are analytically most analogous to the Patterson
majority, in which the court rested its opinion on the idea that “the right to make
contracts does not extend, as a matter of either logic or semantics, to conduct by the
employer after the contract relation has been established . . . .”104 Despite Congress’
1991 overruling of Patterson, many courts have continued to follow the Patterson
103
104
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majority, deciding that once the purchase is made, the plaintiff’s § 1981 claims are
extinguished. Though these courts could view post-purchase discrimination as a
privilege, benefit, term, or condition actionable under the amended statute, they have
declined to do so. Alternatively, these courts could follow Justice Brennan’s suggestion
in his Patterson dissent, and consider post-purchase discrimination evidence that the
initial contract was made unequally.105 However, most courts have taken neither path,
ending their analyses with the fact of the complete purchase and denying the statute’s
protections to this category of post-purchase claims.
The exclusion of post-purchase discrimination from the coverage of § 1981, and
courts’ distinguishing such cases from actionable privileges, benefits, terms, and
conditions cases, is perhaps most clear in Ackaa v. Tommy Hilfiger.106 The Ackaa
plaintiffs argued that their post-purchase harassment by a retail store violated their rights
under subsection (b) of the statute:
Plaintiffs contend that they were denied the right to enjoy all the terms,
benefits and privileges of an implied contract between a retail
establishment and its customers, i.e., to browse, examine and purchase
merchandise without harassment, to leave the store without being
subjected to accusations of theft, and to reenter the store at will for
additional shopping, return or exchange of merchandise.107

The court characterized the plaintiffs’ argument as asserting a “presumed right to be free
of race discrimination while accepting a store's invitation to shop.”108 Because the
plaintiffs had completed their transactions in the store that day, in the court’s eyes, the
only right that remained for them to assert was a “future and potential, rather than
105
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present, opportunit[y] to engage in contractual relations with the defendant.”109 As in the
browser and potential customer cases, a right to a future contract is no right at all under §
1981, and post-purchase discrimination is therefore outside the purview of the statute.
The First and Eighth Circuits have faced post-purchase discrimination claims
similar to Ackaa and come to similar conclusions. In Garrett, an African American
customer successfully purchased an item, left the store, and was then pursued to his home
by police officers who questioned him about shoplifting.110 The First Circuit rejected the
plaintiff’s § 1981 claim, reasoning that “by the time he returned home, his contract with
Radio Shack had been fully performed, and he was not deprived of the benefit of the
bargain by subsequent events.”111 In Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc.,112 a
customer was detained after he purchased a canister of beef jerky in which he had
allegedly stuffed extra jerky from another container. Though recognizing only “scant
precedent” on the issue of post-purchase § 1981 claims, the Eighth Circuit held that
“once the purchase is completed, no contractual relationship remains.”113 Therefore,
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“once Youngblood paid the cashier and received the beef jerky from the cashier, neither
party owed the other any duty under the retail-sale contract.”114
Several district courts have decided post-purchase § 1981 cases in the same way,
viewing the retail contract as a contractual moment and refusing to extend § 1981’s
protections to discriminatory acts by retailers after that moment. In Flowers v. TJX
Cos.,115 African American plaintiffs who were escorted from a store by police after
purchasing could not maintain a § 1981 action because “plaintiffs completed their retail
transactions at T.J. Maxx despite the alleged discrimination of defendants.” In Lewis v.
J.C. Penney Company, Inc.,116 after making her purchases, an African American shopper
was followed to her car, accused of shoplifting, and searched more rigorously than her
white friend. The court dismissed her § 1981 claim on the ground that “Lewis had done
her shopping and was leaving the store; no contractual relationship remained.”117 In
Hickerson v. Macy’s Department Store at Esplanade Mall,118 security guards detained the
African American plaintiff in the parking lot and accused him of stealing a pair jeans he
had exchanged at the store. In granting the store’s motion to dismiss, the court held that
“Had Hickerson been prevented from making a particular purchase, or from returning the
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pants he had previously bought, he might have a section 1981 claim. Because he had
already returned the pants, however, his section 1981 claim fails.”119
Finally, one court has actually cited Patterson, despite its explicit overruling by
the 1991 Civil Rights Act’s amendments to § 1981. In Thomas v. National Amusements,
Inc.,120 the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan relied on Patterson for the
proposition that “conduct that occurs after the formation of a contract and which does not
interfere with the right to enforce established contractual obligations” is not actionable
under § 1981. The court then dismissed the African American plaintiffs’ claim that they,
but not white patrons, were required to exchange the incorrect movie tickets they had
purchased for correct ones.121
The lone exception to the general rulerequiring dismissal of post-purchase
discrimination § 1981 cases is Leach v. Heyman.122 The Leach court accepted as a
violation of § 1981 an African American plaintiff’s claim of post-purchase discrimination
in the form of a racial epithet during a disagreement between the plaintiff and a store
clerk. Rejecting the defendant’s argument that § 1981’s protection is limited to
“circumstances involving a complete refusal to serve members of a protected group,” the
court stated that “racial animus can offend a customer equally whether he gets no service
at all or is served in a manner that marks him with the badge of slavery that the Civil
Rights Acts were enacted to remove.”123 The court reasoned further:
I am persuaded that a jury could find that [the clerk’s] conduct throughout
the course of her dealing with plaintiff was indicative of racial animus,
119
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even though that motivation may have overtly manifested itself only when
[she] came after plaintiff as he was leaving the store. Though she only
called plaintiff a name that any African-American would find deeply
offensive after he had completed his purchases and was about to exit, that
she did so at all is clear and direct proof of bias. It also indicates that the
“service” she provided was less than that which she might have provided,
had plaintiff been Caucasian.124

By recognizing a post-purchase § 1981 violation, the Leach court, like the Allen and
Williams courts above, seemed to view cases in the post-purchase category as close to
those in the category of actionable privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions. The court
also began to move away from the vision of retail contracts as existing only at a single
moment, and the related interpretation of § 1981 as providing protection only at that
moment. By considering the entire “course of [the] dealing”125 between the customer and
the store clerk, the court rejected the more typical, narrow, view of retail contracts and §
1981.
Thus, courts since 1991 have interpreted § 1981 narrowly in two
ways. Some courts have limited the statute’s coverage to only the “make and enforce”
clause, seeming to ignore subsection (b)’s requirement of equality in a contract’s
privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions. Other courts have included the privileges,
benefits, terms, and conditions clause in their analyses, but have accepted very few acts
of discrimination by retailers as actionable. The privileges, benefits, terms, and
conditions that these courts have recognized are all tightly tethered to the contractual
moment, the point of purchase. This twice-narrowed application of § 1981, in turn, has
excluded three categories of cases from the statute’s coverage: those involving browsers
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and potential customers, those involving pre-purchase discrimination, and those
involving discrimination after a customer’s purchase. The next Part attempts to explain
why judges might narrow § 1981, thereby leaving so many cases of clear discrimination
outside the statute’s coverage.
Part V: Explanation of Courts’ § 1981 Jurisprudence
Judges who interpret §1981 narrowly justify their decisions with a similar refrain:
they fear that the amended statute, if unchecked, will be converted from a limited,
contracts-based statute into a generalized anti-discrimination law. 126 This worry about an
unchecked § 1981 seems driven by two underlying concerns. First, beneath courts’
restricted readings of the statute lies a distinction between social and civil rights, the idea
that, though commercial transactions might appropriately be regulated by the state,
private social interactions may not. If courts were to read § 1981 broadly, they would
insert state control into private social behavior properly left unregulated. Courts
therefore define a retail contract as beginning and ending at one discrete point in time and
tie § 1981’s coverage to that single, identifiable contractual moment. In this way, they
limit the statute’s reach into what they might define as the “private,” “social” prepurchase, post-purchase, and browsing behavior of customers and retailers.
This reluctance to expand § 1981 into the realm of private behavior was evident in
Patterson itself, in which the Court supported its denial of the plaintiff’s claim by
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pointing to the statute’s limited scope when applied to acts of discrimination by private
citizens:
The law now reflects society's consensus that discrimination based on the
color of one's skin is a profound wrong of tragic dimension. Neither our
words nor our decisions should be interpreted as signaling one inch of
retreat from Congress' policy to forbid discrimination in the private, as
well as the public, sphere. Nevertheless, in the area of private
discrimination, to which the ordinance of the Constitution does not
directly extend, our role is limited to interpreting what Congress may do
and has done.127

By reading the statute as unable to reach harassment that took place on the job, in the
course of daily interaction among employees, the court signaled its unwillingness to
interpret § 1981 as a general prohibition against private acts of race discrimination not
tethered to a particular contractual moment.
Post-Patterson, post-1991 courts have echoed these sentiments. In Lewis v. J.C.
Penney Company, Inc.,128 the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the contract
between customer and retailer began with the customer’s entry into the store. The court
reasoned that “Allowing plaintiff to proceed under such a theory would come close to
nullifying the contract requirement of section 1981 altogether, thereby transforming the
statute into a general cause of action for race discrimination in all contexts.”129 Similarly,
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in Arguello v. Conoco,130 the Fifth Circuit explained its narrow application of § 1981: “42
U.S.C.S. § 1981 does not provide a general cause of action for race discrimination.
Rather, it prohibits intentional race discrimination with respect to certain enumerated
activities.” In Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc.,131 the Eight Circuit came to the
same conclusion, holding that “Section 1981 does not provide a general cause of action
for race discrimination if in fact it occurred. The requirement remains that a plaintiff
must point to some contractual relationship in order to bring a claim under Section 1981.”
As in Patterson, these courts’ refusal to interpret § 1981 as a bar against
discrimination “in all contexts” echoes the sharp distinctions drawn by early courts
between permissible regulation of civil and political rights and impermissible regulation
of the social sphere. Today’s courts seem comfortable with prohibiting raceand national
origin discrimination at the moment of contract, but shy away from banning
discrimination in other phases of the relationship between customer and store. This linedrawing between the commercial and the social, and concomitant refusal to regulate the
“social,” can be seen as today’s incarnation of early public accommodations cases like
Plessy v. Ferguson.132 The Plessy court made just such a distinction, explaining:
The object of the [Fourteenth Amendment] was undoubtedly to enforce
the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of
things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon
color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a
commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.133
130
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While such line-drawing between civil and social rights is certainly acceptable in some
contexts—a parent’s choice of a babysitter is not and should not be regulated by civil
rights laws, for example—courts deciding § 1981 retail store cases have consistently
drawn that line in the wrong place. A store is no more private than the railroad car in
Plessy; courts’ concerns about regulating private or social affairs is therefore misplaced
in the context of race and national origin discrimination in retail stores.
A second possible explanation for courts’ narrow interpretations of § 1981— and
the “contractual moment” vision of a retail contract that lies beneath those
interpretations— might be a concern about transforming § 1981 into a full-blown public
accommodations law for retail stores.134 In refusing to apply § 1981 broadly, judges have
preserved the political balance struck with the passage of Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, a compromise that resulted in the specific exclusion of retail stores from the
Act’s prohibition of discrimination in places of public accommodation. In an early
version of what eventually became the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II covered “every
form of business” and excluded only “rooming houses with five units or less.”135
However, in response to concerns that such a broad public accommodations provision
would spark resistance by Southern Congressmen136 and doom the bill, the Title II
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proposal was amended to exclude retail stores and personal service firms, such as
barbershops.137 Today’s judges, by limiting the reach of § 1981 in retail stores, have kept
the statute from being transformed into a federal public accommodations act that would
fill the gap left by Congress’ compromise in 1964.138
Like courts’ concern with maintaining the civil-social distinction, this fear of
converting § 1981 into a general anti-discrimination law is reasonable. However, courts
have responded to a reasonable fear in an unreasonable way. In effect, courts interpreting
§ 1981 in retail store contexts have given shopkeepers an affirmative right to
discriminate, a right that no one argues is conferred by retail stores’ exclusion from Title
II.139

have to be monkeying around with. I would want to know whether they smelled good or
bad.’” Id. at 110.
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Part VI: Critique of Courts’ § 1981 Jurisprudence
Whether motivated by a fear of improperly expanding the statute into the realm of
the private and the social or by a desire to preserve Congress’ political compromise
struck in 1964, the courts that have twice-narrowed § 1981 in retail store cases have been
wrong as a matter of statutory interpretation and contract law. They have also been
wrong as a matter of history, making decisions that are at odds with the development of
property and contract law over time.
A. Statutory Interpretation
First, as a matter of statutory interpretation, courts’ narrow applications of § 1981
have ignored the amendments that broadened the statute’s coverage. On the text alone,
judges’ narrow § 1981 decisions are misguided, disregarding an entire clause, subsection
(b), added by Congress in 1991. Judges’ limited readings of the statute have also
departed from the goals of the Congress that passed the 1991 Civil Rights Act, as evident
in the Act’s legislative history. Finally, the narrow view of § 1981 is contrary to the
maxim of statutory interpretation that remedial statutes are to be read broadly.
Prior to 1991, § 1981 guaranteed to all persons the same right as white citizens “to
make and enforce contracts.” In 1991, Congress added subsection (b) entitled “‘make
and enforce contracts’ defined,” which states, “For purposes of this section, the term
‘make and enforce contracts’ includes the making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and
conditions of the contractual relationship.” Though phrased merely as a definition of
“make and enforce contracts,” subsection (b) could in fact be read in multiple ways. The
use of the word “includes” could indicate that the list of contractual activities enumerated
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in the clause is non-exhaustive. Alternatively, the fact that the 1991 amendments were a
reaction to the Supreme Court’s Patterson decision could signal that subsection (b) was
meant primarily to reach discrimination after contract formation, the focal point of the
narrow Patterson decision. Finally, subsection (b)’s reference to a “contractual
relationship” rather than just a “contract” could shift the statute’s coverage to the entire
interaction between contracting parties, rather than just the contents of the final bargain.
In Garrett, Judge Selya chose to read subsection (b) in this way, extending the statute’s
protection beyond the contours of a specific contract:
The 1991 expansion of the definition of ‘make and enforce contracts’ in
section 1981, then, extends the reach of the statute to situations beyond the
four corners of a particular contract; the extension applies to those
situations in which a merchant, acting out of racial animus, impedes a
customer’s ability to enter into, or enjoy the benefits of, a contractual
relationship.140
Yet even if a court does not accept any of these particular readings of
subsection (b), the clause must have some function within the statute. At
minimum, it should act as a signal to courts that the statute’s coverage may not be
read to end with the “make and enforce” clause of subsection (a). Given the
presence of subsection (b), some courts’ complete disregard for the fact that the
statute was amended in 1991, even to the point of citing Patterson, appears quite
strange.141 In some sense, these judges’ ignoring of subsection (b) should not be
categorized under “statutory interpretation” at all. Arguably, this is a question
simply of reading, rather than interpreting.
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However, even the courts that have adopted a slightly broader view of the statute
have appeared to ignore the expanded version of the text, or at least shy away from full
engagement with subsection (b). Very few courts have recognized the potential difficulty
in determining what does and does not fall within the contractual activities enumerated
by the statute. Again, as Judge Selya observed in Garrett, “The harder cases occupy the
middle ground: cases in which a contract was made and the alleged discrimination bears
some relation to it … Particularly after the passage of the 1991 amendment, such
situations call for careful line-drawing, case by case.”142 As illustrated by the pre- and
post-purchase discrimination cases in Part IV, few, if any, judges tackle the hard, case by
case analysis necessary to determine whether a retailer’s discrimination represents
interference with a retail contract’s “making,” “performance,” “modification,”
“termination,” “benefits,” “privileges,” “terms,” or “conditions.” Instead, these courts
have generally dismissed plaintiffs’ claims, drawing the boundaries of the statute’s
protections very narrowly, and tying its coverage to one, fleeting contractual moment.
In addition to ignoring the full text of the statute, the narrow decisions by these
courts also contradict the goals of Congress in amending § 1981. An examination of the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 shows that Congress was motivated by
dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court’s restricted Patterson decision and a desire to
expand the reach of the statute beyond the moment of contract formation. In his
discussion of the amended statute, Representative Henry Hyde of Illinois described the
new § 1981’s expanded scope. His reference to an African American child’s admittance
to a private school could just as easily apply to retail stores:
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As written, therefore, section 1981 provides insufficient protection against
racial discrimination in the context of contracts. In particular, it provides
no relief for discrimination in the performance of contracts (as contrasted
with the making and enforcement of contracts). Section 1981, as amended
by this Act, will provide a remedy for individuals who are subjected to
discriminatory performance of their employment contracts (through racial
harassment, for example) or are dismissed or denied promotions because
of race. In addition, the discriminatory infringement of contractual rights
that do not involve employment will be made actionable under section
1981. This will, for example, create a remedy for a black child who is
admitted to a private school as required pursuant to section 1981, but it
then subjected to discriminatory treatment in the performance of the
contract once he or she is attending the school.143

Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah made similar observations about the newly broadened §
1981, noting:
[W]e have overturned the Patterson versus McLean case, to cover racial
discrimination in terms and conditions of contracts under section 1981.
All postcontract matters will now be covered by the racial provisions of
section 1981, and that is a good step. President Bush has been willing to
overturn Patterson versus McLean from the beginning, and so have all of
us.144

Section 1981 in the form described by Representative Hyde and Senator Hatch is
therefore quite broad, and would seem to provide significant protection beyond the
contractual moment.
In addition to Representative Hyde’s and Senator Hatch’s comments regarding the
new statute’s scope, other Senators and Representatives commented on its proper method
of interpretation. An interpretive memorandum by the sponsors of the Senate bill, which
also represented “the views of the [George H.W. Bush] administration,” explained that
the statute’s new second clause expanding the definition of “make and enforce contracts,”
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was “illustrative only, and should be given broad construction to allow a remedy for any
act of intentional discrimination committed in the making or the performance of a
contract.”145 According to the sponsors, the amended statute’s enumeration of “making,”
“performance,” “modification,” “termination,” “benefits,” “privileges,” “terms,” and
“conditions” should only be a starting point, a floor, rather than a ceiling. Given this
legislative history, courts’ narrow § 1981 decisions have strayed not only from the text of
the amended statute, but also from the goals of the 1991 amendments.
Finally, judges’ restricted applications of § 1981 fly in the face of the basic canon
of statutory interpretation that remedial legislation is to be read broadly, to favor the
legislation’s beneficiaries. Though canons of statutory interpretation can certainly be
challenged, those challenges do not justify courts’ narrow interpretations of § 1981 in
retail store cases.146 Judge Posner has outlined a major critique of the “broad
interpretation” canon, arguing:
The idea behind this canon is that if the legislature is trying to remedy
some ill, it would want the courts to construe the legislation to make it a
more rather than a less effective remedy for that ill. This would be a
sound working rule if every statute -- at least every statute that could fairly
be characterized as “remedial” (which I suppose is every regulatory statute
that does not prescribe penal sanctions and so comes under another canon,
which I discuss later) -- were passed because a majority of the legislators
wanted to stamp out some practice they considered to be an evil;
presumably they would want the courts to construe the statute to advance
that objective. But if, as is often true, the statute is a compromise between
one group of legislators that holds a simple remedial objective but lacks a
majority and another group that has reservations about the objective, a
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court that construed the statute broadly would upset the compromise that
the statute was intended to embody. 147

Judge Posner’s critique rests on two contingencies: that the statute not be truly remedial,
and that the statute not be passed by a convincing majority of the legislators. As an initial
matter, civil rights statutes, particularly those passed during Reconstruction, are
quintessentially remedial. The Supreme Court has held with regard to the Equal
Protection Clause, the authority under which § 1981 was reenacted in 1870, that “broad
interpretation [is] particularly important with regard to racial discrimination, since that
was the principal evil against which the Equal Protection Clause was directed, and the
principal constitutional prohibition that some of the States stubbornly ignored.”148
Adding another remedial layer, Congress then amended § 1981 specifically to remedy the
harm done by the Supreme Court’s narrow Patterson decision. Congress also gave
unmistakable support to the 1991 amendments: the Senate passed the Act with a vote of
ninety-three to five, with two not voting, and the House passed it by a margin of 381 to
thirty-eight votes, with thirteen not voting.149 Critiques such as Posner’s, though perhaps
applicable to other categories of statute, fall short when applied to § 1981. Though
judges could comfortably employ this maxim of statutory interpretation in § 1981 retail
store cases and extend the statute’s coverage to many claims they now dismiss, many
steadfastly refuse to do so.
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B. Contract Law
These narrow analyses are also wrong as a matter of contract law. As outlined in
Part III, courts have interpreted both the duration and the content of retail contracts quite
narrowly. For the most part, they have viewed the contract as beginning and ending with
the moment of exchange of money for goods. They have also seen retail contracts as
bargains solely for the goods purchased. Though courts’ § 1981 decisions seem
motivated by this narrow view of contract, it is in fact extremely rare to find a § 1981
retail decision in which a judge has actually analyzed the contract at hand, with reference
to principles of contract law. Garrett v. Tandy Corp. is the one exception, with Judge
Selya acknowledging the need to turn to state contract law.150 For the most part, though,
judges have proceeded almost blindly through § 1981 analyses, making conclusory and
unsupported decisions about a retail contract’s duration and content.
In neglecting to analyze the contracts thatlie under a § 1981 claim, courts since
1991 have followed, improperly, in the Supreme Court’s footsteps. Professor Steven J.
Burton criticizes Patterson on this ground, noting, “None of the nine Supreme Court
justices … consulted contract law to interpret that statute, and counsel for neither of the
parties used it in their advocacy.”151 According to Burton, because “section 1981 does
not establish an independent statutory right to make and enforce contracts,” courts have
no choice but to turn to “a right that exists elsewhere in the law—in particular, in the law
150
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of contracts.”152 By failing to draw upon the body of contract law, both the Patterson
Court and post-1991 courts have issued decisions in § 1981 retail store cases that are
flawed, particularly in their treatment of a retail contract’s duration and content.
1. Duration
Courts could define a retail contract’s duration in several ways. First, a contract
might be viewed not as a moment, but rather as a continuing interaction between the
contracting parties. “Contract” becomes a verb, rather than a noun.153 In this view,
§ 1981 does not protect the contents of a particular agreement frozen in time, but instead
a customer’s ability to exercise his or her right to contract over the course of his or her
interaction with a retailer. The customer’s movement through the store, evaluation of the
merchandise, and consideration of the store’s various guarantees and representations
would all be components of the retail contract. The contract is formed gradually, as a
product of the customer’s exercise of his or her right to contract over time. Any
interference with that right, whether before, during, or after a purchase is made, is then
prohibited by § 1981.
In critiquing Patterson, Professor George H. Taylor argues that this view of a
right to contract, exercised over the course of a relationship, is in fact mandated by the
law of contracts:
If the Court had been more attentive to the insights of contract law, it
would have realized that contract law denies that the moment of contract
formation is decisive. The Uniform Commercial Code, for example,
acknowledges the potential need to define contract formation where “the
moment of its making is undetermined.” As the secondary commentaries
have suggested, the Code recognizes the possibility of circumstances
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contrary to the orthodox catechism that there is a definite moment in time
when a party becomes contractually bound on a promise.154

Burton makes a similar point, describing the contract right as “a single integrated legal
power” and noting that, “[f]ar from isolating formation, performance, and enforcement
from each other, the modern law of contracts treats the stages of contract as
interdependent and mutually supporting parts of a coherent social practice.”155 Here,
Burton’s argument echoes the characterization of contract as “evidence of a vital,
ongoing relationship between human beings” from Justice Stevens’ Patterson dissent.156
Though Burton was writing in 1990, when § 1981 covered only contracts’ making
and enforcement, his insights hold true today when applied to the broadened statute. If
all customers possess an integrated, continuing right to contract, and the “moment of
contract formation” is indeterminate, courts can then view the interaction between a
retailer and those who enter his or her store as occurring on a continuum. Browsers could
not be excluded from § 1981’s protections, as a browser’s movement through the store
and contemplation of the store’s goods and prices would represent an exercise of his or
her right to contract. In addition, customers who have already made purchases become
browsers or potential customers once again, or are parties to a continuing contractual
relationship with a retailer, able to “enforce” or “perform” their contract with regard to
the goods purchased. Contracts in retail stores loop back on themselves, and those who
enter are at every point exercising in some manner an integrated “right to contract.”
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A scenario suggested by Professor Elizabeth Warrren157 illustrates this view of a
retail contract’s duration. From the time a potential customer enters a retail store, he or
she begins to exercise the right to contract, and the terms of the contract between the
customer and retailer form over time. If browsers and potential customers are not
allowed to walk freely through a store, ask questions, examine the goods available,
compare prices, and consider stores’ representations of the quality of the goods, they miss
critical steps in the contracting process. For example, a banner hanging in a store
advertising a money-back guarantee or a sign describing the goods sold as “100 %
cotton” would become part of the contract between store and customer. If a customer is
discriminatorily pulled into a back room on suspicion of shoplifting or ejected from a
store prior to making a purchase, he or she is not allowed to read the banner or consider
the sign, and has not been able to exercise equally his or her right to contract. This view
of “contract” as a verb rather than a noun, as a process rather than a moment, stays true to
the contract law underpinnings of § 1981 and gives full force to Congress’ broadening of
the statute in 1991. However, courts have not adopted this view, and instead issue
opinions that rely on the misguided idea that a retail contract begins and ends at a single
moment.
A second possible view of a retail contract’s duration draws more explicitly on
present-day state contract law, and contemplates a series of contracts’ being made and remade throughout a customer’s time in a store. In Garrett v. Tandy Corp., the First Circuit
stated that, “[S]hopping in a retail store may involve multiple contracts. Each time a
customer takes an item off the shelf, a new contract looms, and each time the item is
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returned, the potential contract is extinguished.”158 Though in the end the Garrett court
upheld the lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim, its decision is notable in its
engagement with the law of contracts.
Because no state law definition of a retail contract existed in Maine, where
Garrett arose, the court drew on state contract cases from Maryland, Georgia, and
Oklahoma to develop this vision of rolling and continuous retail contracts. These three
cases concerned a retailer’s responsibility for pre-purchase injuries suffered by customers
from exploding soda bottles. In order to determine the retailers’ liability, the courts had
to determine first whether the customer had entered into a contract with the store at the
time of the explosion. Unlike the courts deciding § 1981 retail store cases, the Maryland,
Georgia, and Oklahoma Supreme Courts uniformly distinguished between a retail
contract and a retail sale. In these courts’ analyses,
[T]he retailer's act of placing the bottles upon the shelf with the price
stamped upon the six-pack in which they were contained manifested an
intent to offer them for sale, the terms of the offer being that it would pass
title to the goods when [the customer] presented them at the check-out
counter and paid the stated price in cash. We also think that the evidence
is sufficient to show that [the customer’s] act of taking physical possession
of the goods with the intent to purchase them manifested an intent to
accept the offer and a promise to take them to the check-out counter and
pay for them there.159

The Georgia Supreme Court explained further that a customer could manifest his or her
“acceptance” in one of three ways:
(1) by delivering the goods to the check-out counter and paying for them;
(2) by the promise to pay for the goods as evidenced by their physical
delivery to the check-out counter; and (3) by the promise to deliver the
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goods to the check-out counter and to pay for them there as evidenced by
taking physical possession of the goods by their removal from the shelf. 160

By stocking the shelves, a store makes an offer, or a promise, to sell. By picking up the
item, the customer accepts, and makes a return promise to pay. The contract is made at
that point, and the sale, a separate transaction, is completed at the checkout counter.
Only one § 1981 retail store court has come close to viewing the interaction
between a customer and a retail store in this manner. In Ackerman v. Food-4-Less, the
court stated:
The purpose of going to a grocery store is to buy groceries. The purpose
of picking an item off the shelf at a grocery store is so one may buy it. We
feel that it is a very reasonable inference that Plaintiff picked up the
Spanish spice powder so that she could purchase the seasoning.161

The court therefore seemed to view the plaintiff’s “taking physical possession of the
goods by their removal from the shelf”162 as an acceptance of the store’s offer.
Nevertheless, later in the decision, the Ackerman court reverted to an idea of the contract
and the sale as being identical and existing only at the moment of purchase, stating that if
the plaintiff had been able to purchase groceries, a contract would have been made.163
This collapsing of contract and sale into a single contractual moment is the typical
approach by courts in § 1981 retail store cases, despite state contract law to the contrary.
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This state-law based interpretation would save the claims of shoppers who
experience pre-purchase discrimination. Because the contract is made when a customer
chooses an item from a shelf, this view of contract formation would also preserve the
claims of potential customers who consider purchasing but do not complete a sale.
However, as in Garrett itself, claims of post-purchase discrimination would still remain
outside the coverage of § 1981. Taylor notes this problem:
In the example favored by treatise writers, where a customer is injured by
a bottle that explodes after the customer has taken it off the grocery store
shelf, a contract between store and customer had already been formed at
the time of injury -- the merchant had made an offer through the stocking
of the goods, and the customer had accepted the offer through the
performance of taking the item from the shelf. Under this logic, where a
cashier [engages in discrimination after the purchase], this occurs
subsequent to the formation of a contract and so does not present a viable
section 1981 claim.164

Claims of browsers, who possess no intent to purchase and therefore might not pick up
items from shelves, are left out of this formulation of retail contract as well. This view of
contract therefore falls short. In order to bring such claims within the ambit of § 1981,
courts would need to shift their focus from the contractual moment to thecontractual
process, and begin reading § 1981 as Justice Stevens did in Patterson, as concerned with
the ongoing relationship between retailer and customer.
A final proposal for defining a retail contract’s duration has its roots in
Blackstone’s writings on the obligations of innkeepers and common carriers to the public.
In this view, a retail store makes an “offer” of its goods by opening itself to the public.
The customer then “accepts” by making a purchase. Professor Joseph William Singer
relates that, in his 1765 Commentaries on the Laws of England, Sir William Blackstone
164
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identified as an “offer” an innkeeper’s, common carrier’s, “or other victualler[’s]”
hanging of a sign advertising his services.165 When a customer “steps inside” and
“tenders the usual fare,” he or she accepts the offer, and the contract is made.166 Wesley
Hohfeld agreed with this formulation, noting that the only way an offeror of public
accommodation could rescind his or her offer would be to go out of business.167 More
recently, Professor Stephen E. Haydon has proposed that “any business that extends a
general offer of the sale of goods or services arguably has made an offer to contract, and
anyone denied the opportunity to contract because of his or her race may invoke section
1981.”168
In the retail store context, the store’s sign would represent the retailer’s offer, and
a customer’s payment at the checkout counter would represent “tendering the usual fare.”
The contract would then be complete. If post-1991 courts were to adopt this view of a
retail contract’s duration, many § 1981 retail store claims that courts currently dismiss
would survive. Any pre-purchase discrimination by a retailer between the time a
customer enters a store and arrives at the checkout counter would represent a violation of
§ 1981, likely a core infringement on the customer’s ability to “make” a contract.
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Discrimination against browsers and potential customers, as well as post-purchase
discrimination, however, might still stand on shaky ground.
Yet despite the historical roots of this conception of a retail contract’s duration, it
is almost certainly wrong. As Singer notes, it is unlikely that the mere fact that a retail
store is open for business could constitute a specific offer to an individual shopper.169 In
addition, the modern § 1981 plaintiffs who have attempted to characterize a retail
contract’s duration in this way have failed. In Lewis v. J.C. Penney, the plaintiff
“claimed the existence of an unstated, unwritten contract between commercial
establishments and the public, that all who enter premises of the former will be treated
equally regardless of race.”170 In rejecting what it characterized as a “nebulous contract
theory,” the court stated that, “Allowing plaintiff to proceed under such a theory would
come close to nullifying the contract requirement of section 1981 altogether, thereby
transforming the statute into a general cause of action for race discrimination in all
contexts.” Likewise, in Ackaa v. Tommy Hilfiger,171 the court rejected the plaintiff’s
argument for a “presumed right to be free of race discrimination while accepting a store's
invitation to shop.” Building on decisions like Lewis and Ackaa, Professor Deseriee A.
Kennedy summarizes courts’ approach: “Most courts do not recognize as viable claims of
black plaintiffs to the same right to shop as whites. Consumers who allege
discriminatory treatment in the form of being followed or subjected to heightened
surveillance, without more, frequently fail to articulate a viable cause of action under
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Section 1981.”172 Thus, like the rolling contracts in Garrett, the Blackstonian idea of a
store’s general offer to the public, accepted by a customer’s tender of money, is also
inadequate.173 For § 1981 to provide the protection its drafters in 1866 and its revisers in
1991 intended, courts should revise their vision of a retail contract’s duration, and accept
the idea of contract as a process, rather than a moment.
2. Content
In addition to their missteps in defining the duration of a retail contract, courts
have been wrong in limiting the bargain between a customer and a store to the goods
purchased. In his Patterson dissent, Justice Brennan highlighted the absurdity of the
court’s decision to restrict the content of an employment contract to only the offer and
acceptance of the job. Analogizing the Patterson plaintiff’s situation to one in which an
employer informs an African American applicant that she is hired, but will have to suffer
racial harassment on the job, Justice Brennan stated, “I see no relevant distinction
between that case and one in which the employer's different contractual expectations are
unspoken, but become clear during the course of employment as the black employee is
subjected to substantially harsher conditions than her white co-workers.”174 The retail
store analog to Justice Brennan’s hypothetical job offer is a circumstance in which a
172
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retailer states to customers, “You can make purchases in my store, but if you are African
American, Latino, or Asian American, you will have to suffer racial harassment in order
to do so.” Like the Patterson majority, the post-1991 courts that have applied § 1981
narrowly would likely dismiss the claim of a customer presented with such a statement.
Except in cases like those described in Part III.C, in which the harassment occurs at the
point of purchase, courts have focused only on the goods sold, and excluded from the
contract, and therefore also from the statute’s coverage, the quality of the service
provided.
An alternative view of the content of retail contracts, closer to that of Justice
Brennan in his Patterson dissent, would include services as well as goods as part of the
bargain between the store and the customer. Indeed, one could argue that, because it is
nearly impossible to make a purchase without interacting with some store personnel,175
the quality of the service provided by that personnel must then be part of the customer’s
contract with the store. As Kennedy observes, “It is artificial to separate out those acts
inimical to shopping from the exchange of tender for goods at the cash register.”176
In contexts other than retail stores, courts have been willing to recognize services,
as well as goods, as part of the bargain between seller and purchaser. Professor AnneMarie Harris argues that “there is precedent for the proposition that § 1981 proscribes
race-based harassment . . . when such conduct degrades— but does not completely
deny— goods or services for customers of color.”177 Courts’ willingness to consider
service as part of the contract between buyer and seller is most clear in § 1981 claims
175
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brought by plaintiffs discriminated against in restaurants. Though courts have not been
entirely uniform in their treatment of § 1981 restaurant claims, many have held
unequivocally that a customer contracts with a restaurant not only for the food purchased,
but also for the service provided.178
In Charity v. Denny's, Inc.,179 for example, the African American plaintiffs were
harassed by a waiter, who stated, “Management can't force me to serve niggers.” The
court refused to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim, despite the fact that they were successfully
able to purchase food, and had thereby made a contract with the restaurant. The court
held that “Dining in a restaurant includes being served in an atmosphere which a
reasonable person would expect in the chosen place. Courts have recognized that the
contract formed between a restaurant and a customer does include more than just the food
ordered.”180 Similarly, in McCaleb v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc.,181 the African American
plaintiffs ordered pizza to eat inside the restaurant. The restaurant personnel refused to
give them plates, napkins, and utensils, and told them to eat out of the pizza boxes. The
defendant argued that the plaintiffs had no § 1981 claim because “they were not denied
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the right to contract in that they were provided their pizza and permitted to eat it at the
restaurant.”182 The court, however, held that the restaurant had failed to provide the
plaintiffs with the “full value of their purchase” by denying them “the accoutrements that
are ordinarily provided with a restaurant meal at the Godfrey Pizza Hut.”183 Finally, in
Perry v. Burger King Corp.,184 the court refused to dismiss the § 1981 claim of an
African American plaintiff who was refused access to the restaurant bathroom after he
had purchased, and eaten, his food. The court held that “plaintiff has stated a claim under
§ 1981, particularly if Perry is considered to have contracted for food and use of the
bathroom.”185
In each of these three cases, courts have defined the contract between customer
and restaurant as encompassing more than the food sold. They have recognized the
service provided by restaurant staff, “atmosphere,” “accoutrements,” and use of the
bathroom as contractual terms protected by § 1981. Notably, courts accepted these
additional contractual terms even though Denny’s, Pizza Hut, and Burger King are all
fast-food, low-cost establishments, not known for their “atmosphere” or high-end service.
There is no principled reason why service should not also be considered part of the
contract between a customer and a retail store. Many of the claims cited in Parts III and
IV arose out of acts of discrimination in clothing stores, where customers must often
consult with salespeople in order to try on clothes. Even in supermarkets and
convenience stores, customers must often ask for assistance in locating items on the
shelves. In addition, retail store customers, just like restaurant patrons, often need to use
182
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the bathroom. Finally, a retail store’s “atmosphere” certainly affects a customer’s
decision to spend his or her money there or elsewhere. Just as a customer’s movement
through a store, asking of questions, comparison of prices, and evaluation of the quality
of goods might be relevant to a contract’s duration, these services might also be
considered additional parts of a contract’s content. Courts’ continued insistence on
excluding services from their consideration of retail contracts, except in situations where
discriminatory service is tightly tethered to the contractual moment, therefore appears
without foundation.186
C. Historical Development of Property and Contract Law
Finally, courts’ narrow § 1981 decisions are out of step with the historical
development of property and contract law. As explained in Part V, courts have expressed
great reluctance to transform § 1981 into “a general cause of action for race
discrimination in all contexts.”187 As a result, they restrict § 1981’s coverage to “core”
claims— a retailer’s outright refusal to deal or imposition of discriminatory terms and
conditions at the moment of purchase— and leave plaintiffs with claims of pre-purchase,
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“contractual moment” view of contract, the nature of which judges investigate by
observing post-purchase behavior.
187
Lewis, 948 F. Supp. at 371-72.
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post-purchase, browser, and potential customer discrimination with no remedy. In
essence, these courts’ narrow applications of the statute produce only two rules that
retailers must follow: allow all customers equal entry and take all customers’ money on
equal terms at the checkout counter. However, seen in its historical context, this effort to
prevent § 1981’s improper expansion in fact imposes quite radical requirements on
retailers, and contradicts foundational assumptions of private property and freedom of
contract. The fact that courts enforce § 1981’s two radical rules without protest, but then
balk at requiring equal treatment of browsers, potential customers, and pre-purchase and
post-purchase customers seems quite odd.
Historically, the right to exclude was seen as “the most central right associated
with property.”188 In 1885, the Bowlin court expressed a concern that § 1981 might be
interpreted to make inroads on a retailer’s right to deny entry to any member of the
public. Addressing the question of an African American ticket holder’s right of access to
a skating rink, the Bowlin court rejected any reading of the statute contrary to the rule that
“neither [the plaintiff], nor any other person, could demand, as a right under the law, that
the privilege of entering the place be accorded to him.”189 However, just as the Bowlin
court feared, courts today apply § 1981 to eliminate the retailer’s right to exclude. As the
Sixth Circuit explained in Watson v. Fraternal Order of Eagles,190 in order to make the
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retail contract the statute protects, a customer must first be able to enter a store. “Were it
otherwise, commercial establishments could avoid liability merely by refusing minorities
entrance to the establishment….” 191 Today’s statute, in effect, grants customers a
privilege to enter, eliminates retailers’ right to exclude, and creates a defense to retailers’
claims of trespass.192
The change in courts’ interpretation of § 1981 from Bowlin in 1885 to Watson in
1990 was not inevitable. Indeed, courts had at least two colorable arguments for
continuing to uphold retailers’ claimed right to exclude in the face of § 1981 challenges.
First, they could have decided that, despite § 1981’s property law implications, the statue
simply is not a public accommodations law mandating equal access for all. Here, they
could rely on the fact that in 1875, a mere five years after § 1981 was reenacted pursuant
to the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress passed a separate federal public
accommodations law. Congress therefore could not have meant § 1981 to be interpreted
as a public accommodations statute, for the 1875 law would then have been
duplicative.193
Second, as described in Part V, Congress in 1964 did not include retail stores in
the coverage of Title II, the public accommodations portion of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Courts could refuse to use § 1981 to make an end-run around Congress’
withholding of public accommodations protection to retail stores in 1964. Despite these
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options, today’s courts do interpret § 1981 in retail store contexts as requiring retailers to
allow customers to enter. Though this application of the statute destroys “the most
central right associated with property,”194 courts nevertheless repeatedly uphold the
claims of plaintiffs who assert core § 1981 claims of retailers’ outright refusals to deal.
Courts’ interpretations of § 1981 make similar inroads on basic notions of
freedom of contract. As summarized by Singer, legal thinkers during the classical era
conceived of the freedom of contract as encompassing not only the freedom to make
contracts, but also the freedom from forced contracting.195 Singer identifies this principle
as the root of such doctrines as fraud, duress, and incapacity, all examples of situations in
which a contracting party’s entry into a contract is not of his or her free will.196 This ban
on forced contracts also applied to those contracts forced by statute: “Ultimately, the
courts interpreted the constitutional protection of liberty and property to prohibit
regulation of market relations by the legislature as well.”197 An additional component of
the classical approach to contracts was a prohibition on the state’s “regulat[ion] of the
substantive terms of private relations.”198 Thus, to legal theorists in the classical era, all
decisions regarding contracts— whether to make them and what content they should
have— were assigned to the individual contracting parties and were required to be free
from both private and public coercion.
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Seen in this light, even today’s courts’ narrow application of § 1981 to core
claims of retail store discrimination is contrary to classical notions of freedom of
contract. Retailers are forced to deal with all comers, regardless of whether they would
otherwise choose to make such contracts. As with the property law dimensions of
§ 1981, this interpretation of § 1981 is radical, but not inevitable. Singer relates that
§ 1981’s language on the right to contract might have been interpreted as requiring only
the enforcement of contracts made between willing parties. In this view, customers
would not be able to force retailers to sell to them, but would be able to enforce a contract
in court once made.199 This is not the view taken by courts in current § 1981 retail store
cases. As illustrated in Causey, courts read as a core § 1981 violation a retailer’s refusal
“to engage in business with a consumer attempting to contract with the merchant.”200
Section 1981 therefore trumps retailers’ objections to forced contracting, and requires
unwilling parties to transact with one another.
Given the history of property and contract law, courts’ willingness to overcome
retailers’ right to exclude and freedom of contract in their applications of § 1981 to
discrimination in retail stores seems quite radical. It is hard to understand why, having
taken such steps, courts would then narrow the statute to exclude claims of discrimination
by browsers, potential customers, and pre-purchase and post-purchase plaintiffs. The
exclusion of these claims seems odd on several dimensions.
First, if a greater power— or prohibition— generally also includes the lesser, it
would appear that, once granted the greater right to enter a store, a customer would also
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possess the lesser right to consider the merchandise without discrimination.201 Seen from
the other direction, once granted the greater power to force a retailer to contract, a
customer could also claim the lesser power to shop before or exit after purchasing free of
discriminatory harassment.
Second, it seems unlikely that Congress actually contemplated a § 1981 regime
that would force retailers to allow customers into their stores and block retailers from
ejecting them, but then make customers sitting ducks for discrimination at any point
except purchase. Could § 1981 really reflect both Congress’ reluctance to legislate the
“private,” “social” interactions of customers and retailers between entry and purchase and
Congress’ complete disregard for retailers’ right to exclude and freedom of contract?
Though such a reading of the statute seems implausible, today’s courts apply § 1981 in
just this way.
Third, courts’ alarm at the idea of expanding § 1981’s coverage into “all
contexts,”202 though perhaps reasonable, seems misplaced. As an initial matter, it is
unclear why courts have adopted the idea that additional protection of retail customers
under § 1981 will pave the way to § 1981 regulation of truly private interactions at dinner
parties or in book clubs, for example. Retail store plaintiffs are not arguing for coverage
in “all contexts,” but rather for coverage in all phases of their contractual relationship
with a retail store.203 Yet even if courts were only alarmed by expanded coverage of
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browsers, potential customers, and pre- and post-purchase plaintiffs, their alarm would
still be misplaced. Seen in light of property and contract law, the proper time for alarm
was 1866, when Congress first passed the “absolutely revolutionary” § 1981.204 It is
slightly absurd that courts continue to express alarm at interpreting § 1981 broadly, given
that even the most “conservative” application of the statute to “core” cases, which courts
do willingly, requires radical property and contract law decisions.
Once courts recognize that their current, “narrow” applications of § 1981 in fact
impose quite heavy burdens on retailers at the point of entry and the point of purchase,
their arbitrary limitations on the statute’s coverage appear unjustifiable. Courts should
recognize § 1981 as the radical statute that Senator Trumbull and his colleagues knew
they were passing in 1866. They should cease arbitrarily creating a no-man’s-land
between the point of entry and before and after the point of sale in which acts of
discrimination are permitted and protected.
Part VII: Directions for an Improved § 1981 Jurisprudence
A. Model § 1981 Retail Store Cases: Statutory Interpretation, Duration, and
Content
Though most courts have interpreted § 1981 since the 1991 amendments very
narrowly, and have based their decisions on a constricted view of the underlying retail
contract, some courts and commentators have adopted broader analyses. These
expansive interpretations of the post-1991 statute should serve as models for future
courts’ § 1981 retail store decisions. These courts have also bothered to analyze the
contractual relationship between customer and retailer, and have taken a view of the
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contract’s duration and content that is more nuanced and more loyal to contract law than
in most § 1981 retail store opinions.
First, Garrett v. Tandy Corp. shows courts the appropriate way of interpreting the
scope of the post-1991 statute. In Garrett, the First Circuit characterized the 1991
amendments as having expanded the statute’s reach to “situations beyond the four corners
of a particular contract.”205 The court also explained the history of § 1981, noting that, in
response to Patterson, “Congress widened the interpretive lens when it enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.”206 Though the court ultimately decided against the plaintiff’s claim
on contract law grounds, Judge Selya’s description of the broadened post-1991 statute
serves as a model. As in Garrett, courts should consider § 1981’s requirement of
equality not only in a contract’s making and enforcement, but also in its performance,
modification, termination, privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions.
Second, courts would benefit from engaging with the law of contracts, as did the
Garrett court. However, courts should be wary of adopting wholesale the First Circuit’s
contract law analysis, for it veers dangerously close to the discredited Patterson practice
of denying the statue’s coverage to claims of post-purchase discrimination. Courts
should instead follow Professor Burton’s and Justice Stevens’ approach, viewing the
entire interaction between a retailer and those who enter a store as part of a single
contractual relationship.
In Leach v. Heyman, the court began to develop a Burton-like view of a retail
contract’s duration. The court analyzed the entire “course of [the] dealing” between a
store clerk and a customer, reading the earlier transaction between clerk and customer in
205
206
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light of the clerk’s later harassment. On this basis, the court concluded that the “service”
the clerk had provided was necessarily “less than that which she might have provided,
had plaintiff been Caucasian.”207 Just as discrimination while shopping implicates any
eventual purchase, discrimination after purchase alters a customer’s shopping experience
in a way that white customers’ experiences are not altered. Browsers’ rights are similarly
protected as part of the ongoing contractual interaction between a retailer and those who
enter his or her store. Thus, courts should adopt the suggestions of Professor Burton and
Justice Stevens, follow the example of Leach, and begin to view retail contracts as
ongoing relationships, rather than a collection of discrete, disaggregated moments.
Third, in determining the content of retail contracts, courts should look to Allen v.
U. S. Bancorp,208 as well as courts’ analyses of § 1981 restaurant cases such as
Charity,209 McCaleb,210 and Perry.211 These courts have properly seen services, in
addition to the goods or food purchased, as integral parts of retail and restaurant
contracts. Indeed, it is near-impossible for a customer to make a purchase without
interacting in some way with store personnel. It is hard, then, to justify courts’
interpreting § 1981 as permitting store staff to provide shoddy service because of a
customer’s race or national origin, as long as they ultimately transact with that customer.
Courts should therefore combine their broadened view of the statute with a broadened
view of the contract upon which the statute is built, and recognize services as well as
goods as part of the retail bargain.
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B. Other Avenues for Relief
As outlined in Part I, though Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not
protect against discrimination in retail stores, some state and local public
accommodations laws do include retail stores in their coverage. For plaintiffs in those
jurisdictions, state or local law provides an additional avenue for relief. However,
because not all state and local laws provide such protection, and because many § 1981
contracts-based claims fail, plaintiffs have turned elsewhere in search of legal redress.
1. § 1981 Full and Equal Benefits Clause
In addition to bringing claims under the portion of § 1981 concerned with
contracts, many plaintiffs who have been discriminated against on the basis of race or
national origin in retail stores have also brought claims under § 1981’s other major
clause. This portion of the statute, known as the full and equal benefits clause, states:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens.212

At first glance, this clause seems to provide another avenue for relief for plaintiffs in
retail store cases, allowing them to make claims for deprivations of their liberty by store
security guards or seizure of allegedly stolen goods, for example. However, there is a
split among the circuits over whether the full and equal benefits clause protects against
discrimination by private actors. In Chapman v. Higbee Co.,213 the Sixth Circuit held en
banc that an African American plaintiff could state a § 1981 full and equal benefits claim
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against a private security officer and store manager who had accused her of shoplifting
and searched her person and her belongings. The court focused on the text of § 1981’s
subsection (c), which was added by Congress as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and
states, “The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.” According to
the Sixth Circuit, the language of this subsection permits only one interpretation of the
statute: that “section 1981 plainly protects against impairment of its equal benefit clause
by private discrimination.”214
Other circuits have adopted a similar interpretation of the statute, though not
specifically in retail store cases. In Phillip v. University of Rochester, 215 the Second
Circuit held that a plaintiff may succeed on a full and equal benefits claim against a
private actor “without making a traditional state action showing.” Likewise, the Fifth
Circuit, even before the 1991 addition of § 1981’s subsection (c), allowed a claim of
discrimination under the full and equal benefits clause against private citizens.216 Finally,
though the Tenth Circuit has not spoken on the issue, a Kansas district court has adopted
this same approach, refusing to read a state action requirement into § 1981’s full and
equal benefits clause.217
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The Eighth Circuit, however, has come to the opposite conclusion, holding that
plaintiffs must make a showing of state action in order to bring a § 1981 full and equal
benefits claim. In Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., the plaintiff brought suit
under both clauses of § 1981. The Eighth Circuit allowed the contract-based claim to
proceed, but upheld dismissal of the plaintiff’s full and equal benefits claim, reasoning
that, “Because the state is the sole source of the law, it is only the state that can deny the
full and equal benefit of the law.”218 The Third, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits have followed
suit, predicting in dictum that full and equal benefit claims against private actors would
fail.219 In two district court opinions that specifically address race discrimination in retail
stores, courts have also required state action for a successful § 1981 full and equal
benefits clause claim.220
In June 2004, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Sixth Circuit’s Chapman
v. Higbee, leaving this issue unresolved.221 At present, though, in the Sixth, Second,
Fifth, and perhaps Tenth Circuits, the full and equal benefit clause of § 1981 might
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provide an additional opportunity for legal redress for plaintiffs who have been
discriminated against in retail stores.222
2. § 1982 Right to Purchase Personal Property
A second avenue for relief for victims of retailers’ discrimination might be 42
U.S.C. § 1982, § 1981’s companion statute guaranteeing to “all citizens of the United
States” the “same right… as is enjoyed by white citizens” to “inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” However, as Professor Kennedy
observes, “Section 1982 can be applied to lost contractual rights, but it is applied no more
broadly than Section 1981.”223 Indeed, the plaintiffs who have brought both § 1981 and §
1982 claims have found their claims succeeding or failing together. In Shen v. A&P
Food Stores, the court held that a grocery store’s refusal to serve the plaintiffs violated
both § 1981 and § 1982. “[B]ecause of the related origins and language of the two
sections, they are generally construed in pari materia. [G]roceries constitute personal
property and the refusal to sell groceries is a denial of the right to enter into a
contract.”`224 Likewise, in Morris v. Office Max, Inc., the court dismissed both the
plaintiff’s § 1981 and § 1982 claims, stating that, “Because of their common origin and
purpose, § 1981 and § 1982 are generally construed in tandem.”225
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However, in one case of retail store discrimiation, a court has analyzed claims
under the two statutes separately. In Leach v. Hyman, the plaintiff won on his § 1981
contracts clause claim but lost on his § 1982 claim.226 The court concluded:
[The plaintiff] cannot make out a claim under § 1982, because he was,
regardless of Heyman's racial animus, able to purchase the items that he
had selected. Nothing that he wanted to buy was withheld from him, or
only made available to him on terms and conditions that differed from the
terms and conditions pursuant to which it was available to others.227

Interestingly, the Leach court adopted an unusually broad view of the protections of §
1981’s contracts clause. In allowing relief under that statute, however, the court pulled
back on § 1982, and refused to extend that statute’s coverage to the limits of the coverage
provided by § 1981.
Because most courts interpret § 1982 as coextensive with § 1981 in retail store
cases, however, § 1982 fails to provide an additional viable option for plaintiffs who have
been discriminated against by retailers. Commentators have suggested few remaining
strategies for such plaintiffs, among them common law claims, plans for law reform, and
tactics for consumer empowerment.
3. Common Law Claims, Law Reform, and Consumer Empowerment
To plug the holes created by the failure of many § 1981 and § 1982 claims and the
scanty coverage of retail stores under state and local public accommodations laws,
Professors Harris and Kennedy have suggested that plaintiffs bring common law tort
claims against retailers who discriminate. Harris argues that a retailer’s detention of a
shopper “on suspicion of shoplifting” gives rise to claims for false imprisonment and
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perhaps assault and battery.228 She notes, however, that these claims are often doomed
by laws that permit retailers, in the name of “protect[ing] their goods,” to stop and search
“‘in a reasonable manner shoppers reasonably suspected of shoplifting.’”229 Kennedy
adds to the list of available common law claims defamation, negligent training and
supervision, and negligence.230 Yet she, too, notes problems with plaintiffs’ relying
solely on common law tort claims, observing that “By suppressing or marginalizing the
racial aspect of the claims, reliance on state law claims perpetuates the belief that
profiling customers is an appropriate means of protecting a business.”231
Given the hurdles that plaintiffs face in attempting to use § 1981, § 1982, and the
common law to obtain a remedy for retailers’ discrimination, it is not surprising that
commentators have advanced proposals for law reform. Building on an argument by
Professor Neil Williams, Harris suggests that courts interpret the common law
requirement of good faith and fair dealing in contracts as prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of race.232 Harris points out a flaw in this proposal, however, noting that
“customers who were merely browsing in the store could arguably be characterized as not
yet engaged in the formation, performance, enforcement, or termination of a contract.”233
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Indeed, the texts of § 205 of the Second Restatement of Contracts and §1-203 of the
Uniform Commercial Code concerning the duty of good faith and fair dealing both refer
only to the “performance” and “enforcement” of contracts. If courts interpreting this
common law requirement adopt a narrow view of the duration and content of retail
contracts that is similar to the view adopted by most courts in § 1981 contracts clause
cases, the reach of this proposed common law solution would be quite limited.234 In
addition, it is possible that retailers might discriminate on the basis of race or national
origin in good faith. Such discrimination might be a response by a non-racist retailer to
the racist beliefs of his or her customers or co-workers. A plaintiff who is discriminated
against might therefore lose if he or she only relies on the common law requirement of
good faith and fair dealing.235
Professor Singer proposes a second way that the common law of property might
be altered to address the problem of discrimination by retailers. Singer suggests that,
under the common law, once owners of private property convert their property into a
place of public accommodation, they lose their right to exclude. He explains:
[T]he common-law rule allowing arbitrary exclusion of customers is
based on an illegitimate conception of private property, which supposes
that businesses open to the public are indistinguishable from private
homes. On the contrary, by opening one's property to the public for
234
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business purposes, the owner waives a part of her right to exclude, since
she no longer can claim any legitimate privacy interests.236
This change in the common law— the clear grant of the right to enter retail stores to all
comers and the elimination of retailers’ right to exclude— would contribute to the
elimination of discrimination within retail stores by making clear that retail stores are not
in any sense “private.” By removing this baseline assumption within the common law,237
retailers’ could no longer justify discrimination on their premises by reference to their
status as owners of private property.
A third law reform proposal comes from Amanda G. Main, who advocates that
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 be read to include retail stores in its coverage.238
Main argues first that the statute’s list of covered entities should be read as illustrative,
rather than exhaustive. She maintains that “[t]here is no appreciable distinction between
retail stores and other listed places of public accommodation” because retail stores are as
open to the public and linked to interstate commerce as the listed entities.239 Echoing
Professor Eskridge’s idea of dynamic statutory interpretation,240 Main also proposes that
Title II be read in light of later public accommodations statutes. She points in particular
to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which includes retail stores in its
coverage. “In light of Congress' acceptance of a broad list of places of public
accommodation in the ADA, it is reasonable that Congress would be receptive to a
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similar list of accommodations in Title II.”241 This change in Title II would extend the
federal prohibition on race discrimination in places of public accommodation to retail
stores, and therefore also to those plaintiffs denied protection under § 1981 and other
laws.
Professor Regina Austin suggests a final, extra-legal way of addressing the
problem of discrimination on the basis of race or national origin in retail stores.242 Austin
argues that African Americans should supplement, and perhaps replace, their legal
challenges to retailers’ discriminatory practices by “[g]enerating collective proproduction, pro-distribution sentiments among blacks. . . .” 243 She advocates that
African American shoppers explore “alternative economic arrangements” and “[build] on
the legacy of a black tradition of mutual aid and communal selfhelp.”244 She offers as an
example successful “shopping areas, housing projects, and credit unions” owned and run
by African American churches.245
Austin also issues a challenge, urging African Americans to “embrace the idea
that economic resistance is something every black can engage in every day. Blacks must
take on the mantle of outlaws or bandits, for example, when it comes to passing dollars
from one black hand to the next as many times as possible before the dollars fall back
into the grasp of someone else.”246 Here, Professor Austin echoes the now-famous
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response of Patricia Williams, an African American law professor, to a white store
clerk’s refusal to let her enter a clothing store:
I am still struck by the structure of power that drove me into such a
blizzard of rage. There was almost nothing I could do, short of physically
intruding upon him, that would humiliate him the way he humiliated me…
In this weird ontological imbalance, I realized that buying something in
that store was like bestowing a gift: the gift of my commerce… I was quite
willing to disenfranchise myself in the heat of my need to revoke the
flattery of my purchasing power. I was willing to boycott this particular
store, random white-owned businesses, and anyone who blew bubble gum
in my face again.247

To Professor Austin, and perhaps also Professor Williams, the law’s options for redress
for victims of discrimination in retail stores are shamefully insufficient, and shoppers like
Professor Williams, along with Samaad Bishop and the McCrea family introduced in Part
I, are left with only the options of boycott and selfhelp.
C. Conclusion
This paper has argued that the “right to contract” protected by § 1981 is a process
rather than a moment. The statute protects the entire contractual relationship between
customer and store: entering, browsing or samplingthe goods available, interacting with
store personnel, completing a purchase, and finally exiting the store. It has also argued
that stores provide services as well as goods, and § 1981 demands that those services be
provided equally to all customers, regardless of their race. Finally, it has argued that §
1981 cannot be interpreted as mandating equal access, but then permitting unequal
treatment at all points except the checkout counter. Congress attempted to broaden §
1981 in 1991 to correct this very mistake in logic; today’s courts have continued to
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interpret the statute, and the retail contracts on which the statute pivots, narrowly and
improperly.
Some might respond to the critiques offered in this paper, and to the alternative
proposals raised by commentators, by arguing that the status quo is appropriate, and that
the market, unaided by judicial intervention, will remedy the problem of race
discrimination by retailers. Professor Richard Epstein takes this position in his attacks on
the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.248 Epstein argues
that, if the prohibition on discrimination in places of public accommodation were
repealed, “Is there anyone who thinks that even one major corporation would adopt a
policy of exclusion on the grounds of race or sex? Or if it did, that it could profit by that
strategy in the marketplace?”249 Epstein’s questions depend on two related assumptions:
that the power of withheld consumer dollars would force discriminatory retailers out of
business, and that non-discriminating retailers in fact exist as alternatives for African
American, Latino, and Asian American shoppers.
Research summarized by Professor Harris contradicts these assumptions by
revealing the extensive and pervasive nature of race discrimination in today’s market.
Harris cites Gallup poll results in which thirty percent of African American respondents
reported that they had experienced discrimination while shopping during the last thirty
days, and twenty-one percent had been discriminated against while dining out.250 In
another study by economist Peter Siegelman, survey evidence places “the probability of
discrimination [against African American customers] in any given restaurant visit or
248
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shopping trip [at] roughly one to five percent.”251 Likewise, a study of the retail industry
by Professors Carol M. Motley of Howard University and Thomas L. Ainscough of the
University of Wisconsin-Whitewater found that “African Americans wait longer for
customer service than whites of the same gender.”252 Though surveys and studies are
certainly open to criticism, these results reveal, at minimum, that race discrimination in
retail stores is alive and well, and that Epstein’s vision of a market fix is unrealistic and
flawed.
The continued existence of race and national origin discrimination by retailers and
the dearth of options for legal redress point to the need for courts to correct their flawed
§ 1981 contracts clause jurisprudence. Courts must cease ignoring the 1991 amendments
to the statute, and interpret it broadly, consistent with canons of statutory interpretation
and Congress’ goals. They must correctly analyze a retail contract’s duration, adopting a
view of a right to contract that is exercised over the course of the entire relationship
between customer and retailer. They must also consider service as well as goods as part
of the bargain between customer and retailer. Each of these changes would bring the
claims of browsers, potential customers, those discriminated against before purchasing,
and those discriminated against afterward within the ambit of the statute.
If judges continue to apply § 1981 narrowly, and to build their § 1981 analyses on
a correspondingly narrow vision of a retail contract’s duration and content, they will
continue to permit race and national origin discrimination by retailers. Judges will allow
clear-cut race and national origin discrimination to exist in some protected zone that they
deem outside the contractual relationship and beyond the statute’s coverage. “Whites
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only” signs at stores’ entrances are relegated to our country’s past. It is wrong for judges
today to adopt an interpretation of § 1981 that protects the exercise of similar
discrimination, but within a store’s doors. In effect, these judges are allowing retailers to
implement their own “whites only” policies, providing to white customers only a
harassment- and discrimination-free shopping experience. In the words of Justice
Brennan, “One wonders whether [such a judge] still believes that race discrimination—
or, more accurately, race discrimination against non-whites— is still a problem in our
society, or even remembers that it ever was.”253
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